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Workers have long served as unwitting "guinea pigs,"
providing useful toxicological data which helped to protect the
public. The effects of most environmental pollutants, such as
carbon monoxide, lead, mercury and also of most human carcinogens were first detected in workmen; the in-plant environment is a concentrated toxic microcosm of that outside....
...

The demand of labor to participate actively in pro-

tecting the health and safety of workers is basic and inalienable
and cannot be sacrificed to economic interests.'
The [industrial] safety movement has dwelt unduly upon
carelessness of the worker and has stressed too little the importance of safe tools, safe machines, safe practices, and safe construction. Carelessness and ignorance on the part of the worker
are undoubtedly responsible for many accidents but chiefly for
*
Visiting Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. Professor
of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo.
1. The quotation is from a statement by 28 prominent scientists in
medical and related fields in support of a chemical workers' strike
against Shell Oil Company that primarily developed over a "strong"
health and safety clause. The draft was obtained from the Oil, Chemical
and Atomic Workers' Union (OCAW). The union's efforts were also
supported by 10 environmental and public interest organizations.
OCAW Union News, May 1973, at 5. See also BUREAU OF NATIONAL AF-

FAIRS, OSHA AND THE UNIONS:

A BNA SPEcIL REPORT (1973)
PORT].

BARGAINING ON JOB SA.ETY AND HEALTH-

[hereinafter cited as BNA SPECIAL RE-
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the accidents of a minor character. . . . The constant presence
of human fault must not be permitted to obscure the fundamental causes which can only be reached by the reformation of
2
wrong conditions.
Occupational hazards in American workplaces have only
recently become matters of general concern. Yet the problem
is not new and its dimensions are staggering.3 It is estimated
that with a population of 80 million American workers, more
than 10 million work-related diseases and injuries occur each
4
year, of which over two million are disabling and 14,000 fatal.
Industrial disability results in annual losses of approximately 250
million working days-ten times more than the losses due to
strikes-costing an estimated 1.5 million dollars in wages and
resulting in an annual loss to the gross national product of eight
billion dollars." The average worker annually sustains six days
of absence and more than sixteen days of restricted activity due
to some type of job disability; one out of eight workers suffers
a job-related injury each year. 6
Despite the myth of progress in this area, the situation has
been steadily deteriorating. Although new state and federal
safety legislation has been enacted, the injury frequency rate for
2.

Chaney & Hanna, Can Serious Industrial Accidents be ElimiLABOR REV., Aug. 1917, at 2, 15.
3. The human issues involved in health and safety disputes and
the anguish faced by American workers are described in R. ScoTT, MusCLE AND BLOOD (1974).
The long history of corporate, federal, and state
indifference to the dangers of working with asbestos is reported in P.
BRODEuR, ExPENDAmLE AiEmmcANs 3-106 (1974). The book illustrates the
extent to which one company exceeded even the consensus standard for
exposure to asbestos, long after the health hazard had been generally
acknowledged. Id. at 75-106.
4. "In only four years time, as many people have died because of
their employment as have been killed in almost a decade of American
involvement in Vietnam." H.R. REP. No. 1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 14
(1970). See H. & A. SoMERs, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION: PREVENTION,
INsuRANcE AND REHABILITATION or OccuPATIoNAL DIsABILrrY 6 (1954).
5. Statement of 28 scientists in support of Shell strike, supra note
1. See Schauer & Ryder, New Approaches to Occupational Safety and
Health Statistics, MONTHLY LABOR REv., March 1972, at 14. The article,
written by an economist and a research analyst in the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, points out that current figures understate the extent of occupational injury and illness. See also H. HEINRicH, INDusTR iL AccIDENT
PREVENTION 50 (1950). George Schultz, when Secretary of Labor, estimated that five times as many man-days are lost as a result of injuries
as from strikes and that the economic cost is several billion dollars each
year. Hearings on S. 2193 & S. 2788 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess.,
pt. 1, at 77 (1970).

nated?,
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6. OIL, CEMIcAL AND ATOlvIC WORKERS' UNION, CrrIzENsIP-LEGisLATIVE DEP'T, INFO FOR A LIVABLE INDUSTRIAL ENVIRONMENT 10 (1974).
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all industry rose from 11.8 per million man-hours in 1961 to 15.2
in 1970, an increase of 29 percent.7 The most commonly cited
statistics, although horrifying enough, probably underestimate
the real tragedy. A recent study commissioned by the Department of Labor found that at least 25 million serious injuries and
deaths go uncounted each year and that the discrepancy in the
Department's figures due to underreporting could be as high as
8
eight to ten percent.
These statistics, moreover, primarily reflect accidents and
injuries, not occupational diseases that often develop from longterm exposure to dust, noise, heat, cold, or various toxic chemicals. The cases of disease that are counted are only those which
are recognized-those resulting from such extremely dangerous
or unhealthy conditions that the cause of the disease is obvious.
Uncounted are the millions of workers who die prematurely of
common illnesses, such as heart and lung disease or cancer, caused
or aggravated by the environmental influences of the workplace.9
7.

U.S. BuREAu OF LABOR STATISTIcS, DEP'T OF LABOR, REPORT No.

406, INJURY RATE BY INDUSTRY 1970 (1972).

American rates are higher

than rates in Western Europe; American workers sustain 14 times as
many deaths and five times as many injuries per year as do Europeans.

For general views on federal safety regulations, see Moore, Federal Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 45 Wis. B. BULL. 46 (1972);
Schmidt, Selected Imortant Featuresand Background of the New Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 3 NATURAL RESOURCES LAW.
241 (1970); Spann, The New Occupational Safety and Health Act, 58
A.B.A.J. 255 (1972).
8. J. GoRoDN, et al., INDUSTRIAL SAFETY STATIsTIcs: A RE-ExArViiNATION; A CRITIcAL REPORT PREPARED FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (1971).
See also J. Gordon, An Evaluation of the National and Industrial Safety
Statistics Program, June 30, 1970 (report submitted to the Office of Planning and Wage and Labor Standards Administration, U.S. Dep't of Labor).
9. J. STrmimAN & S. DAUM, WORK is DANGEROUS TO YOUR HEALTH
4 (1973) [hereinafter cited as STELLmAN]. The National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health stated in a 1972 report that 390,000 cases
of job-related illnesses and 100,000 deaths from industrial diseases occur
each year. PRESIDENT'S REPORT ON OccuPATIoNAL SArETY AND HEALTH
11 (CCH ed. 1972). See also J. PAGE & M. O'Biuxx, BiTTER WAGES:
RALPH NABER'S STUDY GROUP REPORT ON DisEAsEs AND INJURY ON THE
JoB (1973) [hereinafter cited as NADER]; F. WALIcK, THE AmERIcAN
WornER: AN ENDANGERED SPEcnms (1972) [hereinafter cited as WALLicK].
A recently completed study of factory and farm employees in the
Northwest suggests that the incidence of occupationally related disease
may be far more prevalent than estimated. The NIOSH-sponsored
study found that diseases suffered by three out of every ten workers
examined appear to be work related, a result three times greater than
previously estimated. A far more chilling finding resulted when researchers compared individual examinations and government records:
ninety percent of the work-related health conditions had not been reported. N.Y. Times, May 12, 1975, at 24, col. 1.
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The potential extent of some occupational diseases has
recently become a matter of public interest. There is, for
example, an increased concern about workers exposed to
potential carcinogens. Scientists predict that 1100 of 6000 Western uranium miners will die of lung cancer in the next 20 years.
Of the approximately 500,000 workers now or previously exposed
to asbestos, it is estimated that 100,000 will die of lung cancer,
35,000 of abdominal or chest cancer, and 35,000 of asbestosis (scar-'
ring of the lungs). The fate of the others might remain unknown
for 20 years.' 0
A team of Public Health Service industrial hygienists conducted a "walk-through survey" of workplaces in over 800 randomly selected industrial plants in the Chicago area, measuring
exposure to potentially dangerous substances such as benzene,
carbon monoxide, carbon tetrachloride, lead, and free silica." A
projection of the survey findings suggests that "more than onethird of the 1,048,851 in-plant workers [in the Chicago area were]
exposed to potentially hazardous working conditions and that approximately 63 percent of the exposures [were] poorly controlled."12 A former United States Surgeon General, Dr. William
H. Stewart, reported on a broader study:
In 1966-67, we studied six metropolitan areas, [and] examined 1,700 industrial plants which employed 142,000 workers. Because of the precise nature of the analyses, it can be statistically
related to 30,000 plants, covering 650,000 workers. The study
found that 65 percent of the people were potentially exposed to
toxic materials or harmful physical agents, such as severe noise
or vibration.
Our investigators examined controls that were in effect to
protect these workers from toxic agents and found that only 25
percent of the workers were protected adequately. The remaining workers were plainly unprotected or working in conditions
which needed immediate attention.13
10. STELLMAN, supra note 9, at 173. The news media are continually furnishing revelations of new dangers. For example, recently reported studies confirmed that employees working with inorganic arsenic
are six or seven times as likely as the general population to develop lung
or lymphatic cancer. N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1974, at 13, col. 1. See Wald,
Forwordto STELLAAN, supra note 9, at xiv.
11. See McClure, An Occupational Safety and Health Survey of an
Urban Area, table III, in Hearings on Occupational Safety and Health
Before a Select Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education
and Labor, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1230 (1969).
12.

Id. at 1228, quoted in NADER, supra note 9, at 7.

13. Hearings on H.R. 14816 Before the Select Subcomm. on Labor

of the House Comm. ox Education and Labor, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 106
(1968).
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Although over 15,000 industrial chemicals and physical
agents are in widespread use,' 4 existing consensus health and
safety standards deal with only a few of them and tend to ignore
their delayed toxic effects:
[T]he long-term effects of the vast majority of chemical and
physical agents used in industry have not been proved, and practically no research is being conducted to find out what these effects are. There are only a handful of medical centers and universities that have even a single researcher in occupational
health. The Department of Labor, which controls many of the
funding agencies for occupational health research, stood at the
bottom of the list in the 1972 budget allocation for funds, receiving only a tiny fraction of the total commitment. Consequently, the research that is done is dominated by industry, and
the results almost inevitably imply that a few or no real problems really exist.15
Concern for the general environment should not ignore
studies demonstrating that workers often breathe air many times
16
worse than the air city dwellers face during pollution alerts.
As Stewart Udall has noted:
Of all the environments inhabited by Americans, the places
where 80 million of us work and spend half our waking hours
are among the most lethal. The blue-collar employee, in
particular, merits hazardous duty pay. He is surrounded by unsafe machines. Toxic substances often seep into his lungs and
blood stream. He may die of job-induced cancer, metal poi-7
soning, quick crushing or slow suffocation from lung disease.'
The industrial environment prior to the passage of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) was controlled, if
at all, by privately established consensus recommendations referred to as threshold limit values (TLVs). They are usually less
than standards thought proper for the general population, but
many workplaces ignore even these modest goals.' 8 Moreover,
industrial hygiene research and standard-setting is substantially
dominated by industry,' 9 and there is little objective investiga14. D. MA~imo, OccuPATioxAL SAP=Y Am HiALTH 25 (S. Werner
ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as MALLmO].
15. STELLMAN, supra note 9, at 6.

16. See WALLicK, supra note 9, at 12. Although the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare recommends a carbon monoxide concentration no greater than 10 to 15 parts per million-the point at which
adverse health affects will appear in a normal population-a consensus
standard for workplaces sets the standard at 50 parts per million. Id.
at 14-15; STELLmAN, supra note 9, at 157.
17. Quoted in WALLicK, supra note 9, at 25.

18. See id. at 26-27, 133.
19. A number of sources document the incestuous relationships between private industrial health research institutes and industry. See,
e.g., R. Scowt, supra note 3, at 174-203. The literature suggests that at

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:647

tion into proper standards. 20 For the 3000 new chemicals that
are introduced into industrial use every year, safety and health
standards are developed for only about a hundred. 21 The
problem is complicated by the use of new energy sources and
processes such as atomic energy, lasers, ultrasonics, and microwaves.

22

The effectiveness of the TLVs is further limited by the small
number of inspectors available for their enforcement; voluntary
compliance does not seem to be widespread. The absence of an
established system for monitoring chemicals in the air also
contributes to a lack of effectiveness. Besides the fact that TLVs
exist for only a small fraction of the industrial chemicals in use,
they are designed to apply only to healthy workers, not to those
disabled in any way. Moreover, even if workers are healthy,
they are often exposed to more than one toxic chemical. The
effect of such multiple exposure is not known, and TLVs do not
take into account the possibility of interaction or cumulative
23
effects.
I.

THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO INDUSTRIAL HAZARDS

Almost hidden in the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments 24 to the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) is a concern for employee
self-help in cases of perceived safety and health threats. Section
502, designated a "Saving Provision," provides in pertinent part
that
the quitting of labor by an employee or employees in good faith
because of abnormally dangerous conditions for work at the
place of employment of such employee or employees [shall not]
be deemed a strike under this [Act].25
The section, generally overlooked until recently, reflects a
judgment that
[a] protest against unsafe working conditions, specifically protected by the Act, is as vital2 a union activity as a strike in support of bargaining activities. 6
least some institutes, especially those funded in large part by industry,
are more concerned with continued production and productivity than
with worker health and safety. See generally P. BRODEUR, supra note 3;
20.

supra note 9, at 6-7.
See WAiacm, supra note 9, at 136.

21.

STrEmL

22.

See BNA SPEcIAL REPoRT, supra note 1, at 14.
STELLA. , supra note 9, at 156.
29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1970).

STELLMA,

23.
24.

,

supra note 9, at 155-56.

25. Id. § 143.
26. NLRB v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 340 F.2d 690, 696 (2d Cir.
1965).
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The recital of horrors at the beginning of this Article is
intended not only to indicate the magnitude of the problem of
unsafe working conditions but also to spotlight the individual
problems facing employees every day. This Article considers the
extent to which federal law, especially section 502, permits
employee self-help in response to workplace dangers; it will
deal with the proper scope of section 502 and its role when
employees are subject to discipline or injunction for taking selfhelp measures. The discussion will also examine the role of
arbitration and no-strike clauses in collective bargaining agreements. First, however, it is necessary to place section 502 in the
perspective of other legal responses to workplace health and
safety threats.
Health and safety legislation has long focused on particularly
hazardous industries. Early state activity was directed at railroads. Because "labor and passenger opinion spoke more forcibly" in legislatures than in the courts, legislation aimed at
ameliorating the effects of industrialization in railroads began
to appear in the states in the latter part of the nineteenth
century.2 7 Some statutes raised the standard of care applicable
in tort actions, while others required the railroads to use particular kinds of equipment. Later in the century, legislatures began
to deal with safety in mines and factories. Although safety
administration was generally lax, these laws did influence civil
litigation, as statutory violations were relied upon to establish
breaches of the standard of care.
Nevertheless, the industrial accident rate continued to increase:
The railway injury rate doubled between 1889 and 1906. At the
turn of the century, industrial accidents were claiming about
35,000 lives a year, and inflicting close to 2,000,000 injuries. One
quarter of these were28serious enough to disable the victim for
a solid week or more.

It is probable that even these figures vastly underestimate the
rate of industrial accidents.
As the accident rate increased, judges began, even in the
absence of legislative guidance, to modify some of the more
obnoxious obstacles to tort recovery, such as the fellow-servant
rule.2 9 While judges and juries were thus bending or modifying
27. For material in this section I am indebted to L.

FRIEDMAN,

HISTORY Or AmmEucAN LAw (1973), especially chapter VI on torts.

28. Id. at 422.
29. Id. at 424.

A
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doctrine to aid injured workmen, the use of contingent fees was
encouraging an increase in litigation. Not until the next century,
however, would workmen's compensation statutes and federal
acts like the Federal Employees Liability Act 30 substitute for a
negligence system that was no longer (if ever) an efficient device
for allocating the costs of industrial accidents. The movement
toward industrial safety was encouraged by notions of riskspreading and insurance as well as the growing power of workers.
Before the passage of the broad provisions of OSHA, however, protection against safety and health risks was inadequate.
In 1969, for instance, the Bureau of Labor Standards of the
Department of Labor estimated that 9.8 percent of the American
work force fell completely outside any sort of safety protection
afforded by state authority.31 Other statistics showed another
aspect of the problem. At least eight states had no identifiable
occupational health program at all. Four had no inspection
personnel, and only three states had over 100 inspectors. The
number of state inspectors prior to OSHA totalled only 1600. Of
82 state and local units dealing with occupational health, ten
agencies were one-person operations and only 20 units in 11 states
employed more than 10 people. 32 One study indicated that states
employed one and one-half times as many game wardens as
safety inspectors. 33 Even many of these employees were not
involved in work directly related to occupational health, but were
involved, for example, in environmental services.3 4 The problem
was aggravated by the limited authority and less than rigorous
enforcement policy of many state agencies. 35 Finally, states
30. 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq. (1970).
31. U.S. BuREAu OF LABOR STATIsTICs, DEP'T OF LABOR, EsTviATED
EMPLOYEE COVERAGE UNDER STATE SAFETY RULE-MAKING AUTHORITY

(1969).
32. Hearings on H.R. 14816 Before the Select Subcomm. on Labor
of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 711,
table I (1968) (comparison of the number of safety inspectors with the
number of fish and game wardens employed by specific states in 1968,
appendix to testimony of George Meany, President, AFL-CIO).
33.

V. TRASKO, STATUs OF OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH PROGRAMS IN STATE

AND LocAL GOVERNmENT 2 (1969) (report for the Bureau of Occupational
Safety and Health (BOSH), U.S. Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare).
34. See NADER, supra note 9, at 82-83. See also R. ScoTT, supra note
3, at 236-62.
35. New York, for instance, reported six fines in 1968, although employers committed over 10,000 violations and the state division of inspection referred 442 cases for prosecution. N.Y. DEP'T. OF LABOR, STATIsTIcs
ON OPERATIONS, SUPPLEMENT TO 1968 ANNUAL REPORT 72, 77 (1969).
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often fractionalized authority among many departments, making
sustained and coordinated action all but impossible.36
Federal concern prior to the passage of OSHA was also
slight, and government hearings on industrial safety rarely
involved nongovernment groups such as labor unions or professional organizations. 3 7 Federal legislation dealt primarily with
specific industries. 38 The most notable multi-industry safety and
health legislation was the Walsh-Healy Act of 1936,39 enacted to
regulate the hours, wages, and working conditions of employees
working under federal contracts for the manufacture or furnishing of supplies and equipment in amounts exceeding 10,000 dollars. Under the Act, the federal government was prohibited from
purchasing supplies or equipment manufactured under "working
conditions which are unsanitary or hazardous or dangerous to
the health and safety of employees." 40 Service contracts exceeding 2500 dollars were covered by the McNamara-O'Hara Service
Contract Act of 196641 and construction contracts by the Construction Safety Act of 1969.42 Safety standards were included in all
these acts but, again, resources and, perhaps, enforcement efforts
were inadequate. Of 75,000 work establishments covered by the
43
Of
Walsh-Healy Act, only five percent were inspected in 1969.
the establishments that were inspected, violations were found
44
in 95 percent; indeed, over 33,000 safety violations were found.
Yet, only 34 formal complaints were issued, only 32 hearings were
held, and only two establishments received the ultimate sanction
36. See NADER, supra note 9, at 84.
37. Id. at 90. The dangers to health and safety in industry were
spelled out in Freye, Protecting the Health of Eighty Million Americans:
A National Goal for Occupational Health, reprinted in Hearings on S.
2193 & S. 2788 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on
Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 1727 (1970).
The report outlined a new national program and recommended a budget
of 50 million dollars to meet the perceived need.
38. See, e.g., Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 30
U.S.C. §§ 801, 811 (1970); Atomic Energy Act of 1946, as amended by
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1970); Federal Safety
Appliance Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1970); Merchant Marine Act of 1936,
46 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (1970); Federal Boating Act of 1958, Pub. L. No.
85-911, 72 Stat. 1754, repealed by Act of Aug. 10, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-75,
§ 41 (a), 85 Stat. 228. A further list can be found in G. G3NSBURG, CASES
AND MATERALS ON FEDERAL LABOR STANDARDS 303 n.3 (1973).
39. 41 U.S.C. § 35 et seq. (1970).
40. Id. § 35(e).
41. Id. § 351.
42. 40 U.S.C. § 333 (1970).
43. NADER,supra note 9, at 95.
44. Id. at 100. See also id. n.14.
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of blacklisting. 45 In explaining the lack of enforcement, the
Deputy Associate Solicitor for Litigation of the Bureau of Labor
Standards stated in apparent earnest:
The policy of the department has always been to treat the act
as remedial, not punitive. If we treated it as punitive,
we
40
would have half the establishments in the country closed.

Considerable pressure in the 1960's for increased safety and

health legislation led to the enactment of safety and health provisions in the McNamara-O'Hara Service Contract Act of 1966,4"
the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966,48 the
Federal Metal and Non-Metallic Mine Safety Act,49 and the
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969.r 0 The last
act amended the 'Coal Mine Safety Act and added disability benefits for black-lung disease. 51 The 1969 amendments to the Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act established health
52
and safety standards in the construction industry.
Although a variety of federal safety programs were eventually established, most were not adequately funded or staffed.

Moreover, charges of political favoritism in their administration
were commonly made, especially by the unions.5 3 In addition,
the statutes themselves were the result of the political process
and often bear the imprint of successful lobbying by wealthy
and well organized employer groups.5 4
The purpose of the federal Occupational Safety and Health
45. Id. at 100.
46. Id.
47. 41 U.S.C. § 351 (1970).
48. 15 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq. (1970).
49. 30 U.S.C. § 721 et seq. (1970).
50. Id. § 801 et seq.
51. For a discussion of the ineffectiveness of the Federal Coal Mine
Health and Safety Act of 1969, see J. FNLEY, TnM CORRUPT KnqGDOM 21822 (1972).
52. 40 U.S.C. § 333 (1970).
53. Union concern with safety, as measured by contract provisions,
has been slow to develop. Since the passage of OSHA, however, there
has been a marked increase in the number of contract provisions dealing
with workplace health and safety. 5 O.S.H.R. 1206 (1975). According to
a recent BNA survey, twelve percent of the sample contracts permit
employees to refuse to engage in hazardous work. See BNA SPEcIAL
REPORT, supra note 1.
54. A recent study suggests that, as early as the progressive period,
coal operators supported federal safety legislation but opposed similar
state legislation, because they feared the latter's adverse competitive effects. Graebner, The Coal-Mine Operator and Safety: A Study of Business in the ProgressivePeriod, 15 LABOa Hi rsOY 483 (1974). The Bureau
of Mines, created in 1910, was sponsored by operators. As might be expected, the Bureau had no investigatory or regulatory powers.
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Act of 1970r is to reduce the incidence of job-related accidents
and eliminate workplace health hazards. OSHA directs the
Secretary of Labor to set and enforce safety and health standards
for an estimated 4.1 million establishments with 57 million
employees. Employers are required to provide a place of employment free from "recognized safety hazards" and to comply with
specified safety and health standards.5 6 They must also make
investigations and keep extensive records. Thus, the OSHA is
57
a labor standards act, more like the Fair Labor Standards Act
58
than the Taft-Hartley Act.
Federal regulation under OSHA is characteristically beset
with totally inadequate enforcement capabilities. As of January
1, 1973, there were fewer than 500 inspectors and only 50
industrial hygienists available to examine 4.1 million workplaces. 0
An independent study estimated that with the
planned complement of inspectors it would take the Department of Labor 58 years to inspect the work establishments
covered by OSHA.60 The lack of enforcement personnel is
especially poignant when contrasted with the magnitude of the
continuing problem as reflected in the inspection figures of the
55. Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified in various sections
of titles 5, 15, 18, 29, 42, and 49, U.S.C.). For discussion of the legislative history of OSHA, see BuaAu OF NATIONAL AFFAmS, ABC's oF THE
JoB SAFET AND HEALTH AcT OF 1970, A BNA OPERATioNs MANuAL 1322 (1971); NADER, supra note 9, at 137-89; Gross, The OccupationalSafety
& Health Act: Much Ado About Something, 3 LoYoLA L.J. 247 (1972).
See also Horneberger, Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 21
CLEVELAND ST. L. REV. 1 (1972); Moran, A Critique of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 200 (1972).
56. See Moran, supra note 55; Morey, The General Duty Clause of
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 86 HARv. L. REv. 988
(1973).
57. 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1970).
58. Id. § 141 et seq. A good, brief description of the enforcement
procedure of OSHA is found in Morey, supra note 56, at 989-92.
59. STELLMAN, supra note 9, at 8.
60. NADER, supra note 9, at 247. In the face of such serious enforcement problems, the Department has attempted to surrender much of its
authority to the states. Id. at 210-11. The Department has also suggested that state plans might be approved under section 18(c) (3) even
though they do not include specific rights granted to employees in the
federal act, e.g., the right of an employee representative to accompany
the federal inspector on an inspection of the workplace or the authority
to promulgate emergency standards. Id. at 219. For conflicting views
on the effectiveness of OSHA, compare Page & Munsing, Occupational
Health and the Federal Government: The Wages Are Still Bitter, 38
L. & CONTEmP. PROB. 651 (1974), with Stender, Enforcing the Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970: The Federal Government as a
Catalyst,38 L. &CoNTEMn. PnOB. 641 (1974).
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Occupational Safety and Health Administration. In September
1974 the agency inspected 6435 establishments, 4410 for the first
time. Only ten percent of the inspections were the result of a
complaint or an accident. Citations were issued for 4306 violations, 61 though inspectors were not even permitted to take the
air samples necessary for determining whether legal concentration limits were exceeded. Such samples could be taken only
by one of the Labor Department's 50 industrial hygienists. 62
Moreover, whereas standards set by the Environmental Protection Agency, for example, are based solely on health considerations,63 the standards under which the'64OSHA inspectors acted
take into account "economic feasibility.

II. HEALTH AND SAFETY AND THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)
broadly protects the right of employees to strike and take other
concerted action for "mutual aid or protection. ' 5 The "reasonableness" of workers' decisions to engage in concerted activity is
irrelevant to the determination of whether a labor dispute exists
and section 7 applies. 66 Thus, a strike over safety or health conditions would clearly be protected under section 7.6 7 A union, how61. 4 O.S.H.R. 837 (1974).
62. STFLmAN, supra note 9, at 8.
63. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-3 (a) (2), -4 (1970).
64. The Secretary of Labor derives standards from semiofficial bodies like the American National Standards Institute, whose "consensus
standards" set maximum levels of health hazards in the context of economic feasibility to employers. STELLMAN, supra note 9, at 9. Stellman
notes that the Government has recommended a new noise standard at
90 decibels. U.S. DE_"T Or HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, HSM No.

73-11001,

CRITaIA FOR A RECOmmENDED

STANDARD:

OCCUPATiONAL

Ex-

NoisE (1972). Even this standard, lower than that demanded
by industry, is a compromise which will result in a hearing loss to a
large percentage of persons exposed to noise of that intensity. The Government, however, does not deem this loss an "impairment," because a
worker would still be able to communicate. STELLMAN, supra note 9,
at 10. OSHA's proposed noise standard has been criticized as inadequate under the Environmental Protection Standard. 4 O.S.H.R. 1608
(1975).
65. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). See generally Cox, The Right to Engage
in Concerted Activities, 26 IND. L.J. 319 (1951); Getman, The Protection
of Economic Pressure by Section 7 of The National Labor Relations Act,
115 U. PA. L. REv. 1195 (1967).
66. NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
67. C & I Air-Conditioning, Inc., 193 N.L.R.B. 911 (1971). See Oldham, Organized Labor, The Environment and the Taft-Hartley Act, 71
MxcH. L. REv. 935, 981-1002 (1973).
POSURE TO
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ever, may waive the sheltered right to strike by agreeing to a contractual no-strike clause. Violation of this clause generally leads
to discharge under the contractual grievance system, since the
no-strike clause is held to establish a rule of conduct for employees. 68 Conduct in violation of such a clause is also considered
unprotected under section 7.( 9
The significance of section 50270 is that it protects some work
stoppages which would otherwise run afoul of the contractual
no-strike clause. Since in the absence of a no-strike clause a
strike over an alleged safety hazard would be clearly protected.
under section 7,71 section 502 has operational value only when
a no-strike clause is otherwise applicable.7 2 In such a case,
section 502 operates as a rule of construction for private agreements, much like the federal policy discussed in Mastro Plastics
Corp. v. NLRB.7 3 In Mastro the Supreme Court decided that,
because of the need to effectively enforce the Act, the normal no-strike clause would not preclude strikes in response
to serious employer unfair labor practices. Similarly, a common
no-strike clause does not encompass strikes over abnormally
dangerous conditions, because of the obvious human interest
4
reflected in section 502.7
The potential applicability of section 502 is great indeed. Nostrike clauses are common," and safety hazards, real or mistakenly perceived, are widespread. Passage of OSHA testifies
to increased congressional concern over safety hazards in the
68. Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962).
69. American Beef Packers, Inc., 196 N.L.R.B. 875 (1972).
70. For the pertinent statutory language, see text accompanying
note 25 supra.
71. NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962); NLRB
v. Belfrey Coal Corp., 331 F.2d 738 (6th Cir. 1964); cf. NLRB v. Southern
Silk Mills, Inc., 209 F.2d 155 (6th Cir. 1953) (spontaneous walkouts and
temporary work stoppages protected by section 7; no no-strike clause
in evidence).
72. See Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368
(1974); Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956). Another
level of analysis exists, since an interpretation of the no-strike clause
might reveal that safety strikes are excluded from its scope. Thus, there
would be no contractual restriction on otherwise protected conduct.
73. 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
74. Since the critical right to strike can be waived by a no-strike
clause, however, it is possible that even the benefit of section 502 could
be waived by clear contract language.
75. A recent survey by the Bureau of National Affairs found that
no-strike clauses appear in 90 percent of all collective bargaining agreements. Moreover, the survey reported a trend toward unconditional
bans on strikes. See BUREAu OF NATIONAL AFFAIRs, LABOR REATIONS
YEmnnooK 1970, at 44 (1971).
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workplace, and employee concern also seems to be growing.
Many potentially important questions concerning the scope of
section 502, however, have not been systematically considered.
The most basic question is whether a good faith belief that an
abnormally dangerous condition exists is sufficient to invoke the
protection of section 502 or whether the test is an objective one.7 0
If the test is objective, how are abnormally dangerous work conditions defined? What if the industry or job itself is inherently
highly dangerous? What is the role of federal and state safety standards? 77 If conditions are abnormally dangerous, no
matter how defined, which employees are protected from employer retaliation for engaging in self-help? 78 Does section 502
permit concerted economic action or only the refusal of particular employees to work under unsafe conditions?
It should be irrelevant that a walkout is not authorized by
the union.7 9 If a no-strike clause is present, even an authorized
walkout would normally be barred unless protected by section
502. It could be argued that a no-strike clause applies only to
authorized activity, since it is the union's promise not to strike.
Although this argument might have some vitality in damage or
injunction cases,8 0 it seems that no-strike clauses do set a
standard for employees under section 7.81 Section 502, however,
should be interpreted to protect even an unauthorized walkout.
The section is aimed at protecting employees and not unions.
Often there may not be time for real authorization-abnormal
hazards cannot be postponed for Robert's Rules and union by76. Compare NLRB v. Knight Morley Corp., 251 F.2d 753 (6th Cir.
1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 927 (1958) (only good faith required) with
NLRB v. Fruin-Colnon Constr. Co., 330 F.2d 885 (8th Cir. 1964) (no reasonable basis for belief that conditions were abnormally dangerous).
See also Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
77. See NLRB, REPOR OR
To'
GENEuAL COUNSEL (June 29, 1972).
78. See Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368
(1974).
79. See NLRB v. Sunbeam Lighting Co., 318 F.2d 661 (7th Cir.
1963); R.C. Can Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 588 (1963); Craver, Minority Action
versus Union Exclusivity: The Need to Harmonize NLRA and Title VII
Policies, 26 HAsTNGs L.J. 1, 33-39 (1974); Getman, The Protection of
Economic Pressure by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 115
U. PA. L. REV. 1195 (1967); Gould, The Status of Unauthorized and
"Wildcat" Strikes under the National Labor Relations Act, 52 CORNE.L
L.Q. 672 (1967). For a brief summary of the legal response to wildcat
strikes, see Atleson, Work Group Behavior and Wildcat Strikes: The
Causes and Functions of Industrial Civil Disobedience, 34 Onio ST. L.J.
751, 773 (1973).
80. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Oil Workers Union, 452 F.2d 49 (7th
Cir. 1971); 86 HARv. L. REv. 447 (1972).
81. Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962).
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laws.82 At a minimum, the section should protect refusals to
work at dangerous tasks. The existence of an applicable grievance system, however, raises difficult questions. Part III discusses these questions.
III. SECTION 502 AND THE INTEGRITY OF TE
GRIEVANCE PROCESS
Section 502 clearly serves as a defense to a disciplinary proceeding, but under section 30183 an injunction may be sought
against a strike allegedly in breach of a contractual no-strike
clause. Section 502 should prevent such an injunction as well
as disciplinary action, even though the strike involves a grievable
matter, because a walkout within that section is statutorily
defined not to be a "strike." This result would seem obvious,
except for recent decisions stressing the Supreme Court's commitment to the peaceful resolution of all contract disputes.
These decisions have muddled the consideration of a strike
arguably protected under section 502 but involving a matter
made arbitrable under the contractual grievance system.
In Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, Local 770,84 the Court
overruled a 1962 decision 8 5 and held that strikes in violation of
a contractual no-strike promise could be enjoined, despite the
anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.8 6 The
decision was not based on the presence of a no-strike clause,
but rather on the fact that a strike had occurred over an
arbitrable grievance.
In the recent case of Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine
Workers,8 t the Supreme Court addressed the two main questions
raised in an injunction proceeding under section 301. First, was
the strike over a matter falling within the arbitration clause?
Second, if so, did the "duty to arbitrate give rise to an implied
no-strike obligation supporting issuance of a Boys Market injunction?"8 8 It seems, however, that the second question has little
vitality. In Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co.,8 9 the Court
recognized for purposes of damages an implied no-strike promise
82. I have urged greater tolerance of wildcat strikes even without
reference to section 502. See Atleson, supra note 79.
83. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
84. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
85. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
86. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970).
87. 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
88.

Id. at 374.

89. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
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concurrent with an arbitration clause; therefore, an affirmative
answer to the Court's first question would normally resolve the
second. Indeed, the Gateway Court expressly held that injunctions could be granted on the basis of a judicially inferred undertaking not to strike.90 The second question would have meaning
only if the agreement should contain an express negation of a
no-strike pledge, an agreement the Court would permit although
it would certainly find it distasteful.9 1
Presumably, a "strike" over a safety issue within the purview
of section 502 does not violate a no-strike clause, whether express
or implied, irrespective of whether the remedy sought is a
damage award or an injunction. The decision in Boys Market,
however, turned on the arbitrable nature of the underlying
dispute. A serious question arises, therefore, if the safety matter
is arbitrable and, thus, arguably enjoinable under Boys Market.
But for section 502, Boys Market would seem to apply. The question to be faced is whether section 502 protects a walkout over
a dispute that is arbitrable. Given the approach in Boys Market,
the answer is not altogether clear. After all, the NorrisLaGuardia Act was seemingly a stronger barrier to strike injunctions than section 502.
There is virtually no legislative history relating to section
502, but, since the section was passed at the same time as section
301, it would seem difficult to argue that it does not apply in
section 301 situations. Moreover, if it does not apply, unions
would be discouraged from agreeing to safety clauses and the
arbitrability of safety and health issues. Since safety has become
a major employee concern, it is foreseeable that a weakening of
section 502 would encourage unions to forego the arbitration of
safety and health disputes in favor of self-help. More importantly, the premise of section 502 must be that safety and health
matters often need instantaneous action which cannot wait for
the operation of grievance systems. 92
Safety stoppages are clearly concerted activities within section 7 unless waived by a contractual no-strike promise. Section
502 provides that certain stoppages will not be considered
"strikes," and the only rational interpretation is that these stoppages are thus not "strikes" within the meaning of a no-strike
90. 414 U.S. at 381-82.
-91. See id.
92. Other parts of section 502 demonstrate a concern for basic hu-

man rights and human responses. See United States Steel v. United
Mine Workers, 74 L.R.R.M. 2613 (3d Cir. 1970).
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clause. Because this is the case, the activity not only is protected
in the sense that discipline would violate the NLRA, but it should
also be protected against injunctive remedies.
The Court, however, has treated section 301 as an independent avenue of relief,93 and the development of section 301
illustrates the Court's hostility to strikes during the term of a
contract. 94 Thus, for instance, a section 301 action may be
brought, even though the activity involved is encompassed by
the unfair labor practice provisions of the NLRA. 95 Whereas
unfair labor practices are enforced by the NLRB independently
of the judicial enforcement of section 301, however, section 502
operates to define the scope of no-strike promises in collective
bargaining agreements. A walkout which falls within the ambit
of section 502 should therefore not be a "strike" violating a nostrike promise in a section 301 injunction action. Nor should it
matter that the underlying dispute is arbitrable, since the issue
is not enforcement of the arbitration clause alone but, rather,
the enjoining of self-help meant to be protected by section 502.
An injunction would force back to work employees who have
a statutory right to cease work because of a safety hazard. The
Senate report on the Taft-Hartley amendments referred to section 502 as establishing that "no provision of the act is to be
construed as compelling an employee ... to work under ab' 96
normally hazardous conditions.
Since a work stoppage encompassed by section 502 does not
violate the no-strike clause, therefore, neither damages nor an
injunction should be available. The policy of section 502, enacted
prior to Boys Market, is obviously to provide a measure of protection to employees facing grave health and safety risks. Indeed,
the section represents a federal interpretation of collective agreements so as to exclude these stoppages from the scope of nostrike clauses. Remedies under section 301, therefore, would
thwart the protection meant to be provided by section 502. Of
course, the propriety of such a walkout can be tested in a section
301 action or in an arbitration proceeding. Many decisions favor
an objective reading of section 502, meaning that employees act
at their peril. That "peril" will be determined by the outcome
93. See, e.g., NLRB v. C. & C. Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1967);
Carey v. Westinghouse Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964).
94. Boys Market v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970);
Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
95. See, e.g., Carey v. Westinghouse Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964).
96. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1947).
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of the section 301 or arbitration proceeding. Yet, although the
propriety of the walkout can be properly adjudicated, once the
walkout is determined to fall within section 502, no injunction
7
should be granted despite Boys Market.0
IV. GATEWAY COAL: SAFETY WALKOUTS
AND INJUNCTIONS
Many of the problems discussed in the preceding section were
highlighted in Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, a case
illustrating the relationship of section 502 to broader issues
involving the enforcement of collective agreements. Workers at
a Pennsylvania mine refused to work so long as three foremen,
who had failed to carry out certain required mine safety procedures, remained in the employ of Gateway. As in many mine
safety cases, the hazard was a substantially reduced flow of air,
increasing the danger of the accumulation of dust and flammable
gas and the risk of an explosion. Pursuant to a request by the
union, federal and state inspectors had toured the mine and
found that the three foremen had made entries in their log books
that failed to disclose the true air flow. The company suspended
the foremen, but later reinstated two of the three (the third
elected to retire) despite the fact that criminal proceedings had
also been brought against them.9s When the foremen returned
to work, the union employees left the job.
The company sought and received an injunction against the
walkout and an order for binding arbitration of the controversy.
In addition, the trial court suspended the controversial foremen
pending the outcome of the arbitration proceeding. The arbitrator subsequently decided that the foremen could be returned to
work and held that the situation did not present a safety hazard.
The union appealed the continuing injunction but not the arbitration award. Thus, although the union had denied the arbitrability
of the walkout and of the safety issue underlying it, the union
focused upon the propriety of the injunction.
97. In any event, most of these strikes will tend to be of short dura-

tion, making injunctive remedies less valuable. The damage remedy is
problematic. A union is not liable unless it authorizes, ratifies, or supports a walkout, and it is not yet clear whether section 301 provides a
remedy against wildcat or unauthorized walkouts. See Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Oil Workers
Union, 452 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1971).
98. The foremen pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of criminal
violation of safety requirements. Each was fined 200 dollars.
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A. ARBITRABiLiTy AND TBE PROPRIETY OF AN INJ

CTION

The issues recognized by the appellate court were whether
the safety issue was arbitrable, and, if so, whether Boys Market
permitted the enjoining of the strike. The court seemed content
to assume that the absence of a no-strike clause did not
necessarily foreclose the granting of a section 301 injunction, but
the second issue was not reached, since the court held that safety
disputes were not arbitrable under the contractual grievance
system.
Although the collective bargaining agreement contained 99a
grievance provision covering "any local trouble of any kind,1
the court refused to apply to safety disputes the presumptive
arbitrabflity concepts set out in the famous Steelworkers Trilogy.100 The Supreme Court had held that "[i]n the absence of any express provision excluding a particular grievance
from arbitration ... only the most forceful evidence of a purpose
to exclude the claim from arbitration can prevail ... ."101 The
federal policy favoring arbitration enunciated in those cases was
based upon the belief that industrial stability would be promoted
by encouraging resolution of industrial disputes through private dispute-resolving procedures. The key to industrial peace,
thought the Supreme Court, was the "inclusion of a provision
for arbitration of grievances in the collective bargaining agreement. o"0 2- Arbitrators were seen as more competent than courts
to resolve these disputes in a way that would lead to industrial
harmony.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, however, felt
that safety disputes were "sui generis," of a "special and distinguishing character," unlike "ordinary" economic disputes. 03
Since the effect of performing unsafe operations could be drastic,
the court seemed to feel that self-restraint would be neither possible nor wise:
Considerations of economic peace that favor arbitration of
ordinary disputes have little weight here. Men are not wont to
submit matters of life or death to arbitration and no enlightened
99. Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 466 F.2d 1157, 1159
(3d Cir. 1972).
100. United Steelworkers v. American Mg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593 (1960).
101. 363 U.S. at 584-85.
102. Id. at 578.
103. 466 F.2d at 1159.
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society encourages, much less requires, them to do so. If employees believe that correctible circumstances are unnecessarily
adding to the normal dangers of their hazardous employment,
there is no sound reason for requiring them to subordinate their
judgment to that of an arbitrator, however impartial he may
be. The arbitrator is not staking his life on his impartial decision. It should not be the policy of the law to force the employees to stake theirs on his judgment. 04
Section 502, said the court, represents the view of an enlightened
society that employees should not suffer when in good faith they
refuse to work because of the fear of imminent harm. 0 5 Rather
than using section 502 to directly protect the walkout from an
injunction, the court of appeals employed the provision to
support its narrow interpretation of the miners' arbitration
clause. Section 502 should motivate a court "to reject any avoidable construction of a labor contract as requiring final disposition
1 06
of safety disputes by arbitration.
The court, therefore, used the policy of section 502 to limit
the scope of the arbitration provision, thus finessing the Boys
Market issue.10' 7 Relying on the Supreme Court's oft repeated
quid pro quo argument, 0 8 the court of appeals decided that the
statutory policy protecting safety strikes argued for their exclusion from general arbitration clauses. Although the miners'
arbitration clause was broad, and safety concerns were included
in the contract, 0 9 the union had argued that no prior safety
104. Id. at 1160.
105. It could not have been unimportant that coal mining is one of
the most hazardous employments in the United States. The injury rate
in coal mining is nearly three times that for manufacturing and two
times that for construction. U.S. BuPxru OF LABOR STATIsTIcs, DEP'T OF
LABOR, REP. No. 406, INmURy RATES BY INDUSTRY 1970, at 3 (1972). See
also 1971 STTisTIcAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 639. The court
did not limit its discussion to mining, however, and seemed to distinguish safety disputes generally.
106. 466 F.2d at 1160.
107. This argument was immeasurably stronger than a previous argument that safety disputes were nonarbitrable because their arbitrability was neither "particularly stated nor unamiguously agreed in the labor contract and the practice of the parties has been to the contrary."
466 F.2d at 1159. On the use of practice to decide questions of arbitrability, see Mittenthal, Past Practice and the Administration of Collective
Bargaining Agreements, 59 MiRcH. L. REv. 1017 (1961). See also Pacific
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Communication Workers, 199 F. Supp. 689 (D. Ore.
1961); R. Szrr, L. MERRILD & D. RoTnscHrD, COLLECTIVE BARGAINNG
AND LABOR AJBITnATioN 260 (1970); Aaron, JudicialIntervention in Lab-or
Arbitration, 20 STAN. L. REv. 41 (1967); Jones, The Name of the Game
is Decision-Some Reflections on Arbitrability and Authority in Labor
Arbitration,46 TEx. L. REV. 865 (1968).
108. See cases cited in note 100 supra.
109. The contract provided that a mine had to be closed if the local's
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dispute had been handled through arbitration." 0 Although the
evidence was far from clear, the court might well have been on
firmer ground if it had relied upon this history to negate arbitra-

bility."'
The viability of the decision was in grave doubt given the
Supreme Court's strong views on arbitrability and the avoidance
of labor strife. Indeed, the decision in Boys Market had actually
relied more on the scope of the arbitration clause than the
2
presence of a no-strike clause to justify a strike injunction."
The court of appeals may have correctly determined that the
policies of section 502 protect the walkout from section 301
remedies, but arbitrability remains a separable issue. The court's
analysis was handicapped by its feeling that arbitrability of
safety disputes necessarily barred strikes over the same issue.
Thus, the court focused on the issue of arbitrability, the issue
that the union had not directly appealed.
On this issue, the court's decision is weakest. There was no
prior judicial indication that safety disputes, unlike "ordinary"
economic disputes, would be excluded from the broad scope of
the Trilogy's presumptions." 3 Moreover, such presumptions are
mine safety committee found it dangerous. In Gateway, the local itself
voted to strike. The court, however, did not rely on this portion of the
contract.
110. See United States Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 74
L.R.R.M. 2613 (3d Cir. 1970).
111. Doubt exists as to the substantiality of evidence required to
overcome the presumption of arbitrability. Warrior & Gulf required
"positive assurance" or the "most forceful evidence." Although bargaining history was ignored by the Supreme Court in Warrior & Gulf, one
court has relied upon such history to overcome the presumption. Pacific
N.W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Communication Workers, 337 F.2d 455 (9th Cir.
1964). But see Communication Workers v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
415 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1969). Compare Lesnick, Arbitration as a Limit
on the Discretion of Management, Union, and NLRB, N.Y.U. 18TH ANNUAL CON'rRCE oi LABOR 7, 9-18 (1966), with Aaron, supra note 107,
at 42.
112. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has had to remind
lower courts, which have too hastily awarded injunctions, that the scope
of the arbitration clause is a critical issue. See United States Steel Corp.
v. United Mine Workers, 74 L.R.R.M. 2613 (3d Cir. 1970). See also
Barnes & Tucker v. United Mine Workers, 338 F. Supp. 924 (W.D. Pa.
1972).
113. In a 1961-62 Bureau of Labor Statistics study of 1,609 agreements containing arbitration provisions, only nine agreements were
found to specifically exclude questions of health and safety from arbitration. U.S. BuREAu OF LABOR STATSmIcs, DEP'T OF LABOR, ARBiTRATION PROcEDures 12 (1966). Correspondingly, safety clauses are appearing in
greater numbers of collective agreements. Some agreements specifically
declare that safety disputes are subject to arbitration. Id. For example,
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not necessary to protect safety walkouts under section 502 so long
as the section is read to protect health and safety walkouts from
discipline, injunctions, and damage awards. Such a result, as
argued by Judge Rosenn in dissent, would harmonize the interests in workers' safety and in the peaceful resolution of labor
disputes. Indeed, the trial court's injunction against the strike
was arguably a proper harmonization of those interests because
it was coupled with the suspension of the very foremen whose
conduct had led to the walkout.
Judge Rosenn argued that even if the strike injunction was
improper, section 502 did not bar an order to arbitrate the dispute. In other words, there was no reason to ignore the federal
policy in favor of arbitration. Indeed, someone must determine
whether section 502 applies, and Judge Rosenn felt that the
arbitrator was qualified to do so. This argument seems sound,
for if self-help is permissible in the interim, an arbitration proceeding would not prolong the period that workers would be
faced with unsafe working conditions. The only problem is that
the arbitrator might confine his inquiry to the literal terms of
the contract unless section 502 is binding on arbitrators as well
as courts.
The majority, however, felt that safety disputes not only
involve the need for a fair settlement under a consensual disputeresolving procedure but also require that the dispute be decided
correctly and expeditiously. It did not doubt an arbitrator's
competence to decide the dispute and would have been hard
pressed to ignore an arbitration clause which clearly included
safety matters.
The application of the presumption of arbitrability in a Boys
Market situation means that the judicial order may include not
simply a directive to arbitrate but also an injunction against the
strike. In the context of a safety dispute, an injunction forces
employees back to work under conditions they feel are dangerous. The arbitrator, furthermore, may subsequently find that
section 14(c) of the basic steel agreement provides for the arbitration
of disputes of employees "who believe they are being required to work
under conditions which are unsafe or unhealthy beyond the normal operations in question." It will be difficult to argue, however, that violations of safety clauses are subject to arbitration 'only when there is such
an express provision. Indeed, unions may prefer to arbitrate safety
grievances, especially when expedited arbitral procedures are available.
See Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n, 138 N.L.R.B. 737, affd, 330 F.2d
492 (3d Cir. 1964).
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the dispute is not arbitrable." 4 If, on the other hand, the court
abandons the presumption of arbitrability, it would next have
to decide whether the parties had in fact agreed to arbitrate
safety disputes." 5 The distinguishing feature of the appellate
court's Gateway decision was the application of a presumption
of nonarbitrabilityof safety disputes, without a thorough look
at the past practices of the parties. Section 502 played a major
role:
[T]he strong and explicit legislative mandate that protects work
stoppages caused by good faith concern for safety should influence a court to reject any avoidable construction of a labor

requiring final disposition of safety disputes by arbicontract as
tration." 0
Because the effect of section 502 is to protect strikes despite a
comprehensive no-strike clause, and because the "[c]onsiderations of economic peace that favor arbitration of ordinary disputes have little weight here,""17 the court held that the contract
should not be construed as providing for compulsory arbitration

of safety disputes.
The court could have reached the identical result on firmer
ground if it had affirmatively employed section 502. Indeed, the
court did adopt a broad reading of that section, stating that "good
faith apprehension of physical danger is protected activity and
not enjoinable .

.

. ."s

Moreover, the court felt that careless

administration of safety regulations fell within the scope of
section 502 just as much as dangerous physical conditions. Had
section 502 encompassed the Gateway walkout, even an express
no-strike clause would not have barred the activity. Thus, the
court could have upheld the order to arbitrate while refusing
to enjoin the strike." 9 Alternatively, arbitrability could have
been rejected because of the absence of an applicable no-strike
clause or because of the operation of section 502. Although the
miners' arbitration clause might be broader than a no-strike
114. See Note, Labor Injunctions, Boys Market, and the Presumption
of Arbitrability,85 HAv. L. REv. 636, 641 (1972); Note, The New Federal
Law of Labor Injunctions, 79 YAmm L.J. 1593, 1602 (1970).
115. Safety matters had apparently not been previously handled
through arbitration under the contract at issue in Gateway. 466 F.2d
at 1159.
116.

Id. at 1160.

117. Id.
118. Id., citing Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n, 138 N.L.R.B. 737,
afffd, 330 F.2d 492 (3d Cir. 1964); Knight Morley, 116 N.L.R.B. 141, aff'd,

251 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1957).
119. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457
(1957).
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clause, the Supreme Court's quid pro quo doctrine could suggest
that the causes of strikes which are not encompassed by a nostrike clause should not, at least presumptively, fall within the
arbitration clause. Such an argument would foreclose the possibility that Boys Market would be used to undercut the policy
of section 502.
The appellate court's decision is noteworthy for its broad
reading of section 502 and the sympathy shown for the plight
of workers facing unsafe conditions. Rather than denigrating
the perceived risks because mining is inherently dangerous, the
court used the inherent danger to stress the strong sensitivity
of miners to safety issues.
The Supreme Court, however, overwhelmingly 120 rejected
the appellate court's decision. The Court held that the arbitration clause was sufficiently broad to encompass the dispute, and
it rejected the appellate court's view that safety disputes were
"sui generis.' 1 2 1 The Court noted that section 502 seemed "to
bear more directly on the scope of the no-strike obligation than
on the arbitrability of safety disputes."'12 2 Moreover, the Court
explicitly applied the Trilogy's presumptions of arbitrability to
23
safety disputes.1
The only dissenter, Justice Douglas, argued that the Trilogy's
presumptions of arbitrability should not apply because of section 502. That section, however, literally goes only to the issue
of whether a "strike" has occurred and not to the issue of the
arbitrability of the dispute. It would be possible to permit arbitration yet refuse to grant an injunction, either because of federal policy under sections 301 and 502 or because of a contractual bar. Justice Douglas went further and found that the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act 1 24 "displace[s] all agree120. The decision was 8-1 with only Justice Douglas dissenting.
121. 414 U.S. at 376.
122. Id. at 377 n.8. The statement is ironic in light of the Court's
assumption in Lucas Fiourthat the presence of an arbitration clause permits the inference of an implied no-strike promise. Boys Market itself
stressed that federal court injunctions were based on the arbitrability
of the underlying dispute. 398 U.S. at 254. The role of the no-strike
clause was not made clear.
123. 414 U.S. at 377-78. The language in Boys Market, however, did
suggest that the presumption of arbitrability might not apply in injunction cases. The Court had said that a strike over an arbitrable grievance
could not be enjoined until the district court "first holds that the contract
does have that effect." 398 U.S. at 254, citing Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 228 (1962).
124. 30 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (1970).
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ments to arbitrate safety conditions.' '1 25 This argument was neither argued before the Court nor supported by legislative history.
Although that Act permits the setting of safety regulations, and
provides detailed ventilation requirements, 126 the Act was not
relied on by the United Mine Workers. Indeed, the union
would not be content to rely on federal regulation which it feels
is unsympathetic and ineffective.
The appellate court's argument that safety and health disputes are distinguishable from other contractual disputes is not
without some foundation. The Supreme Court has stressed the
social values inherent in the peaceful settlement of contract disputes, and it has deemed strikes to be the alternative to arbitration. 12 7 In the Court's view, strikes over contractual disputes
denigrate the arbitral system, a system specially designed to settle
such disputes. The source of arbitration disputes is the contract,
even though the substantive sources may only be implicit. 28 The
strike is an attempt to force a particular result, perhaps at variance with the terms of the contract.
Safety disputes, however, are quite different. Employees
perceiving threats to their safety and health can often be expected to act immediately rather than direct their claims to the cooler
procedures of the grievance system. In a previous article on
wildcat strikes, I noted that workers often do not consider arbitration the appropriate mode for resolving contract disputes, especially those involving perceived diminution of traditional benefits.29 The same may be said of safety disputes. Ordinary contract disputes do not often generate a felt need for immediate
action, but a safety dispute might well create such a motivation.
It is in this sense that "men are not wont to submit matters of
life or death to arbitration.' 3 0
The normal rule in industrial jurisprudence is that employees
must comply with work orders and file a grievance thereafter.
This general rule that "production cannot wait for exhaustion of the grievance procedure" is supported by the notion
that the "grievance procedure is capable of adequately recom125.
126.
127.
(1968).
128.
U.S. 574
129.
130.

414 U.S. at 394.
30 U.S.C. § 863 (1970).
But see H. WELLWGTON,

LABoR AND TBE LEGAL PRoCESS

47-90

See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
(1960).
See Atleson, supra note 79.
466 F.2d at 1160.
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pensing employees for abuse of authority by supervision."'u 3
This notion provides the principal justification for treating
safety disputes differently from economic conflicts. In safety
matters the cost of delay in exhausting the grievance procedure
should be placed upon the employer. 132 Situations of imminent
peril are not subjects for which arbitration is well suited. Competing concerns for continued production are more easily balanced in normal contract disputes than in safety dispute situations. Moreover, the action of the employees might be based not
on a perceived breach of contract by their employer but simply
on a perceived threat to their health and safety. Given the
urgency of the situation and, perhaps, the uncertainty of arbitrability, employees can hardly be expected to always opt for
arbitration instead of immediate action. In addition, the substance of safety disputes will often be directed to sources outside
the contract, such as state or federal statutes and regulations
governing safety and health. Although such disputes could be
settled by arbitrators, they clearly do not involve the kind of
competence lauded in the Trilogy.
A similar situation arises when a strike occurs in response
to an unfair labor practice of an employer. Mastro Plastics Corp.
v. NLRB 33 held that such a strike did not violate an ordinary
no-strike promise and therefore constituted protected conduct
under the NLRA. Mastro was decided before Boys Market, however, and may have been undercut by the latter decision, at least
to the extent that an employer's action could be said to violate
both the NLRA and the contract. Since Mastro protected concerted activities over matters which could have been resolved
under NLRA procedures, safety strikes, expressly protected by
section 502, may present an even stronger case for exemption
from section 301 remedies.
Unlike Boys Market, where the dispute seemed clearly arbitrable, arbitrability existed in Gateway only because of the
Court's application of the presumption in its favor. Since the arbitration clause did not contain an express exception, ordering
arbitration was consistent with precedent. This is not to deny
the human concerns of the court of appeals, but rather to suggest
131. Ford Motor Co., 3 Lab. Arb. 779, 781 (1944) (Shulman, Arbitrator).
132. Expedited arbitration can accelerate this process. See, e.g.,
Agreement between United States Steel Corporation and The United
Steelworkers of America, August 1, 1971, § 14(c), BNA CoLL. BARG. NEG.
& CoNT. § 28.40 (1971).
133. 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
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that its concerns should have been directed primarily to the appropriateness of the injunction rather than to the issue of arbitrability. Employees might be willing to "submit matters of life
and death to arbitration" if arbitration did not entail the enjoining of a contemporaneous strike. There is surely no inherent
reason why arbitration must necessarily occur in a situation free
of economic pressure-arbitration frequently occurs in situations
of tension. Just as economic weapons are "part and parcel" of
collective bargaining, so that unprotected slowdowns do not
134
demonstrate that contemporaneous bargaining is in bad faith,
a walkout, especially over a safety issue, does not threaten the
integrity of the arbitration process.
The Supreme Court, however, clearly perceives arbitration
and simultaneous strikes to be incompatible with its view of federal policy; the function of such a strike must be to affect the
decision of the arbitrator or to negate the effectiveness of the
arbitrator's ruling. This concern of the Court led it to infer a
no-strike promise coextensive with the arbitration clause in Local
174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co.,130 an inference which may
not always reflect the intentions of the contracting parties. The
Court went further in Gateway, permitting an injunction based
upon implied arbitrability and an implied promise not to strike.
Although the normal arbitral rule is that employees must
perform disputed work and then file a grievance, 3 6 arbitrators
do recognize exceptions, 137 such as the right to refuse to perform
hazardous work. 38 Section 502 is rarely mentioned, but the outcome is often similar. The normal arbitral approach is significant because most employees will attempt, at least initially, to
use the grievance process rather than the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The number of safety walkouts reflected
in NLRB decisions is small, 39 and the Board may defer consideration of an alleged NLRA violation until the grievance process
has been pursued. 4 °
134. NLRB v. American Nat'1 Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
135. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
136. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co., 3 Lab. Arb. 779 (1944) (Shulman, Arbitrator). See generally F. & E. ELxouPi; How ARBITRATION WoRs, 15459 (3d ed. 1973).
137. F. & E. ELKOURI, supra note 136, at 156-57.
138. Id. at 671-76.
139. NLRB decisions, of course, do not reflect the great number of
cases which are administratively closed prior to formal decision. See
Atleson, Disciplinary Discharges, Arbitration and NLRB Deference, 20
BuFrAo L. Rav. 355 (1971).
140. See National Radio, Inc., 198 N.L.R.B. 150 (1972).
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Some foreseeable difficulties could be avoided if arbitrators
would apply section 502 as a federal canon of construction in
interpreting no-strike clauses. The role of arbitrators in applying federal law is far from clear, and many arbitrators do not
feel it is their responsibility as "creatures of the contracting parties" to do so, although there seems to be a strong feeling that
contract provisions should be read to be consistent with federal
law if possible.141 Without entering the entire debate, it is worth
noting that many arbitrators are not lawyers and there is a
strong possibility that applying federal law, rather than the contract, is beyond the arbitrator's authority. In United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,

42

an ambiguous arbitra-

tion award was enforced under section 301 because it could have
been read as "embodying a construction of the agreement." 143
But, said the Court, the award might have been read as "based
solely upon the arbitrator's view of the requirements of enacted
legislation, which would mean that he exceeded the scope of the
submission."' 44 The arbitrator may, of course, interpret a nostrike or "just cause" provision so as to be consistent with federal law, and some feel that recognition of the arbitrator's exalted position under the Trilogy, in addition to the NLRB's policy
of deference to arbitration awards, requires that federal law be
enforced irrespective of the agreement. Enterprise Wheel suggests that arbitrators may be bound by the contract despite the
"requirements of enacted legislation."
The question addressed here, however, is the validity of a
strike, not the mere refusal to perform unsafe work. 45 Although
arbitral recognition of safety and health concerns has generally
not encompassed collective action, 46 arbitrators have recognized
a right to take some job actions in certain situations, even though
the underlying dispute may be arbitrable. Thus, if the strike
is protected by section 502-or simply not contractually barredit could continue despite contemporaneous arbitration of the
underlying dispute.
141. See articles cited in R.

SMITH,

L.

AmEuL,

COLLECTIVE BARGAnANnG AND LABOR AsnrrRAnoN 242 (1970).

D. RoTHscHLD,

142. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
143. Id. at 598.
144. Id. at 597.
145. There may be no difference in some situations, for example,
where all the strikers perform work that is affected by the perceived
hazard.
146. F. &E. ELKoum, supra note 136, at 671.
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Even if the strike does not fall within section 502, it nevertheless is enjoinable only if the union has promised not to strike.
Although the Court's ruling in Gateway permits inference of a
no-strike promise, an explicit disclaimer of such a promise would
apparently protect the walkout. The walkout would similarly be
protected if it was encompassed by section 502. Thus, the inconsistency seen by the Court between the promotion of arbitration
and the protection of concerted activity is not necessarily inevitable. Even if the strike aims at altering a situation which could
be resolved by arbitration, there is no necessary inconsistency.
The Court has noted that collective activity is "part and parcel"
of the collective bargaining process 14 7 and arbitration is certainly
a phase of the collective bargaining process. Since there is no
requirement that the employer alter the allegedly unsafe condition pending the outcome of the arbitral proceeding, strikes over
safety matters can be expected to occur irrespective of the law.
I have always been disturbed by the notion that an arbitration clause requires employee obedience and the subsequent filing of a grievance. 1 48 In all disputes, the employee acts at his
or her peril. If the employer is found at fault, there is often
little penalty. The risk to employees in safety situations, however, is potentially very great. But the arbitration process does
not necessarily require employee passivity. It is possible to permit employees to resist and then test the propriety of such resistance in the arbitral proceeding. The inquiry would consider the
perceived peril and not just the question of disobedience. Thus,
strike activity cannot be said to necessarily "substitute individual
action for collective bargaining and to replace the grievance procedure with extra-contractual methods.' 49 Even if it is correct
in general that labor policy requires that "production cannot wait
for exhaustion of the grievance procedure,"'150 it is not at all clear
that employees faced with safety hazards need to eschew selfhelp in the name of production.
147. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
148. See, e.g., Nathan Mfg. Co., 7 Lab. Arb. 3 (1947). The notion
is roughly similar to the necessity of obeying an injunction and appealing
its propriety rather than testing its propriety in a contempt proceeding.
See Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967). Even in this area,
the merits may be reached if time is of the essence and an appeal
would nullify the value of the enjoined action. In any event, no official
tribunal has yet addressed this issue in the context of an employment
situation, and arbitrators do not necessarily defer to management interpretation of contract language or events.
149. Nathan Mfg. Co., 7 Lab. Arb. 3, 6 (1947).
150. Id.
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B. THE UMW AGR xi=
The Gateway Court's only support for its extension of Boys
Market to an agreement not containing a no-strike promise was
a reference in a footnote to Boys Market, suggesting that damages was an ineffective remedy for breach of a promise not to
strike. 151 The reference sidesteps the critical question of whether there was a promise not to strike. If no such promise was
made, then obviously a strike would not have been a breach of
a contractual obligation and the question of effective remedies
would not have been relevant. The Court's decision permits injunctions as well as damages for breach of "implied" promises
not to strike. Although there is little need to add to Justice
Black's biting dissent in Lucas Flour criticizing the Court's desire
to mold collective bargaining in its own image, 5 2 one certainly
could add that, in the light of labor history, an injunction against
a strike is qualitatively much more drastic than an award of damages.
15
The Court, as other section 301 decisions have shown, 3
seems confident of its ability to make agreements for the parties, a right it strenuously denies the NLRB in other, sometimes
Despite the Court's strong feelings that
similar, contexts."
unions should not strike over arbitrable matters, it would apparently feel constrained by a clause clearly permitting such
strikes. 55 The Court's presumptions, however, heavily influence
the determination of intent. Unions will be barred from striking
over arbitrable matters unless a clause clearly permitting such
strikes is present; since it is obviously easier for unions to resist
the inclusion of a no-strike clause than to obtain a clause permitting such strikes, the Court's presumptions alter the bargaining
balance between the parties and, ultimately, affect the substantive provisions of collective agreements.' 50 Even this deference
to the intent of the parties is hedged by the requirement that
the clause permitting strikes be clear. Since strikes are permit151. 414 U.S. at 381 n.14.
152. 369 U.S. at 107.
153. John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964); Local
174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
154. E.g., NLRB v. Burns Internal Security Servs., 406 U.S. 272
(1972); H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
155. See 414 U.S. at 382.
moTON, supra note 127, at 116-17. The 1974 nego156. See H. WkLm
tiations in the coal industry illustrate the problem of placing upon the

union the burden of obtaining explicit contractual authority to strike
over grievances.
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ted by sections 7 and 13 of the NLRA, the irony of the Court's
requiring a clause in the agreement permitting strikes, let
alone an explicit clause, should not be lost. Clearly, the Court's
assumption that strikes are simply inconsistent with arbitration
is the principal bench mark of its opinion. It is not at all clear
why this is necessarily so, especially since the contract may contain a clause permitting strikes. Given the Court's firmly held
position, however, it is not surprising that it found no contractual
permission to strike in Gateway and, subsequently, that section
502 presented no bar to an injunction.
There were two provisions in the United line Workers
(UMW) agreement which could have indicated that the union had
reserved the right to strike. The Court's consideration of these
provisions was limited to discovering whether they "excepted
safety disputes from the general no-strike obligation."'15 7 The
very reference to exceptions from general obligations indicates
that exceptions will be hard to find. The Court thus began a
search for intent with the assumption that intent-a "general nostrike obligation"-already existed. The issue as seen by the
Court is, apparently, whether the contract demonstrates a view
of labor-management relations at variance with the view held
by the Court.
Section (e) of the UMW contract provides for a mine safety
committee empowered to inspect and report its findings to management, and in "special instances where the committee believes
an immediate danger exists," "requires" the employer to follow
a committee recommendation to remove all mineworkers from
the unsafe area. l r8 If the committee acts arbitrarily in closing
down an unsafe area, "members... may be removed from the
committee."'5 9 Grievances which might arise by the employer's
request to remove members of the committee are subject to arbitration.
Although perhaps insufficient to overcome the Court's presumptions of arbitrability, the section does not affirmatively provide that safety disputes are arbitrable. The employer's only recourse for arbitrary behavior under the clause is the replacement
of the members of the mine safety committee. Only the propriety of this action is explicitly made arbitrable. The clause
seems to permit a shutdown even if the underlying dispute is
arbitrable. The Court, however, avoided confrontation of the
157. 414 U.S. at 382.
158. Id. at 383.
159. Id.
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clause by asserting that it had not been invoked by the union.
Although the Mine Safety Committee had investigated, there was
no showing that it had found imminent danger and reported such
a finding to management.
The Court's task, however, is to determine whether a nostrike promise exists. If it does not exist-and section (e) tends
to support the argument that it does not-the failure to comply
with the provision may suggest a breach of contract but not necessarily justify an injunction. The local's membership did vote
to close the mine. Since the membership is a body superior to
the safety committee, sufficient compliance with section (e) may
have occurred. 160 The Court's reply was that compliance was
a contractual question which should be submitted to arbitration,
a reply not responsive to the question whether the union had
a right to strike.1 61
Although the Court did seem to separate the issues of arbitrability and the propriety of an injunction, the Court's analysis
inferred a no-strike clause from the presence of a broad arbitration clause. The contractual provision permitting the mine
safety committee to close down the mine, however, is a contrac160. The Court expressed some disbelief that the clause could re-

quire the employer to follow a decision of the mine safety committee
to remove workers from the area, while giving the employer only the
power to remove committee members if they act arbitrarily. Yet this
is a literal reading of the provision. One commentator reads the clause
the same way. See J. FNLEY, Tm CoRaui' KINGDOm 231-32 (1972). It
is fairly clear that the committee's power to close mines has not been
frequently used. See J. McATEmE, COAL MRE HALTH AND SAFTY: Ta.
CASE OF WEST ViRGnIA 48-49 (1973) [hereinafter cited as McATEaR]. It
is no doubt relevant that shutting down a mine cuts off royalty payments
to the miners' welfare and retirement fund.
161. The arbitrator had found the issue to be arbitrable, but the decision was not free from ambiguity. Rather than finding that section (e)
had not been invoked, the arbitrator found that no "immediate danger"
had existed to justify pulling out the workers, and thus the walkout was
arbitrable. 7 LAw RFPRINTS, LABOR SFIEs, No. 4, at 42-43 (1973/1974)
[herinafter cited as LAw REPINTs].

The implication is that a walkout

justified under section (e) would not have been contractually barred.
The section itself, however, seems to make the removal of committeemen
for arbitrary closure the only arbitrable issue. The arbitrator apparently
acknowledged this in his order, by noting that the company had not
asked for the removal of the committee members. Id. at 47.
The arbitrator, moreover, did not discuss any no-strike obligation,
express or implied. Since he had already found no immediate danger
under section (e), it is unclear on what basis the walkout was ruled to
have violated the agreement. The ruling seems to have been based on
a perceived violation of a clause giving management the power to direct
the work force. See id. at 46. The arbitrator did not order the employees back to work, but the district court had already done that in its restraining order.
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tual right to cease work, indicating that safety disputes are not
to be exclusively resolved "peacefully" by arbitration. A contractual right to cease work could, under the Court's analysis,
indicate that safety matters are not arbitrable. In other words,
the quid pro quo argument could operate in reverse. The Court
overlooked this possibility.
Furthermore, the Court's analysis of section (e) completely
overlooked the history of that provision, a history which suggests that the provision was far more meaningful than the Court
was willing to acknowledge. The 1941 Appalachian Joint Wage
Agreement provided for a Mine Safety Committee which could
investigate and make reports to management but which had no
power to close a mine. In addition, the agreement contained a
broad no-strike clause. 10 2 Negotiations in 1946 on a new agreement included a union demand for improved mine safety, including the right to stop work over safety disputes. Negotiations
deadlocked, and a nationwide stoppage induced President Tru13
man to seize the mines.
Shortly thereafter, the UVIW and the United States executed
a new agreement, known as the Krug-Lewis agreement. Under
this agreement, local union safety committees were expressly
given the authority to initiate safety stoppages, although the

Federal Coal Mines Administrator could halt such a stoppage if
he found the authority was misused. 16 4
Following the Centralia Mine explosion in 1947, the Senate
subcommittee investigating the disaster held hearings which involved the safety provision. The Federal Coal Mines Administrator, Julius Krug, testified that granting miners the right to
close unsafe mines was one of "the two most important moves
toward safety in the history of the soft coal industry. 165 He
further testified that the agreement permitted the safety committees to "pull out the men in all cases of immediate danger."10 6
Moreover, Krug testified to the necessity for self-help measures
in a statement that is as relevant now as in 1947:
Federal inspectors could never achieve continuous mine safety
without the day-to-day participation of the miners themselves.
162. Id. at 154 (union's brief).
163. See Exec. Order No. 9728, 3 C.F.R. 539 (1946).
164. LAW REPRI'Ts, supra note 161, at 155 n.21 (union's brief).
Before a Spe165. Investigation of Mine Explosion at Centralia,Ill.,
cial Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Public Lands, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1947).
166. Id. at 305, 312.
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...
Without minute-by-minute vigilance of these men, each
one a safety expert in his own right, the mine is bound to revert
to unsafe conditions or practices. 167

On July 8, 1947, the union and the private coal operators
executed the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1947,
which, like the agreement with the United States, granted miners
the unqualified right to engage in safety walkouts. 10 8 That provision is similar to section (e) in the 1968 agreement involved
in the Gateway litigation. This history, therefore, strongly suggests that there was no promise to refrain from safety strikes,
an inference which substantially undercuts the Gateway Court's
analysis of the propriety of the strike.
A second provision pertinent to the Gateway litigation also
stems from the 1947 agreement. This was a rescission of previous
no-strike promises in the Appalachian Joint Wage Agreement of
1941 and the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of
1945.169 The union's interest in rescission was undoubtedly
heightened by the injunction and contempt proceedings prosecuted against it. 1 70 Another reason for its interest, however, was
the passage one month earlier of the Taft-Hartley Act, which
provided in section 301 for federal jurisdiction of breach of contract actions. Thus, the rescission occurred after the enactment
of, and partly in response to, section 301. As one court noted,
the purpose of the rescission was to "remove the danger that
the union might be sued for breach of contract under the new
17
statute.") 1

The Supreme Court accorded little significance to the clause
expressly abrogating no-strike promises. The Court read the
clause to merely abrogate prior no-strike agreements, holding
that it had no effect on the "implied" no-strike duty in the current agreement. 172 It is hard to understand why the parties
would abrogate prior no-strike promises and yet "agree" to an
implied promise in the current agreement. If it is assumed that
the specifically mentioned contracts have expired, thus terminating express no-strike pledges, the logical purpose of the rescission
clause, especially in the absence of a specific no-strike promise,
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
1958).
172.

Id. at 298, 301.
LAw REPIN's, supra note 161, at 160 n.34 (union's brief).
Id. at 161 n.34 (union's brief).
United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
United Mine Workers v. NLRB, 257 F.2d 211, 216 (D.C. Cir.
414 U.S. at 384-$5 n.15,
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is to indicate that the union did not waive the right to strike.1 73
The mine safety committee provision, after all, supports the notion that work stoppages were at least permitted over safety is1 74

sues.
The Court's handling of the miners' contractual provisions
suggests that contractual rights to strike must be as clear as exceptions to arbitration clauses. This approach overlooks the historical and emotional differences between arbitration and concerted activities, as well as the importance of employee strike activity.17 1 Moreover, injunctions against strike activity involve the
exercise of extraordinary federal power against otherwise protected activities.
173. Even if prior no-strike clauses had some application, it is possible to argue that abrogation of such clauses would not necessarily be
meaningless. The function could be to preserve the right to strike over
matters not made subject to the arbitral procedure. See, e.g., Lewis v.
Benedict Coal Corp., 259 F.2d 346, 351 (6th Cir. 1958), aff'd by an equally
divided Court, 361 U.S. 459 (1960). The argument, of course, does not
help decide what matters are subject to arbitration, but the presumption
of the Steelworkers Tilogy is used to narrow an abrogation clause, an
analysis which does not involve the intention of the parties.
174. The miners' contract suggests a critical difference from Lucas
Flour, where a no-strike promise was premised on a finding that the arbitration was to be final and binding and that arbitration was to be the
exclusive dispute-resolving procedure. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960). Section (e)of the
miners contract, at least, indicates that not all disputes were to be resolved solely by arbitration.
175. The 1974 Bituminous Wage Agreement has expanded the safety
and health protections afforded miners. Although "[e]very employee
... is entitled to a safe and healthful place to work," art. 11 (a), UMW
Journal, Nov. 1974, at 15, it is unclear if the language is much more than
hortatory. The contract again requires the employer to "remove" employees from any area in which the committee finds an "imminent danger" exists.
A significant addition permits an individual employee to refuse to
work "under conditions he has reasonable grounds to believe to be abnormally and immediately dangerous to himself beyond the normal
hazards inherent in the operation which could reasonably be expected
to cause death or serious physical harm before such condition or practice
can be abated." Art. -II(i)(1), id. at 16. Even if the danger is disputed,
the company must nevertheless assign the employee to "other available
work."
The new clause permits individual self-help, conditioned only upon
a good faith belief of danger, and does not require initial action by the
safety committee. Although the employee's good faith may be tested
in an arbitration proceeding, the employee is permitted to initially refuse
the work. Since this refusal is allowed only in cases where a good faith
perception of danger exists, it does not significantly alter normal arbitral
principles. In addition, the new coal agreement makes safety and health
grievances arbitrable, providing a separate grievance process for resolution of these claims. Art. 1II(p), id.at 17-18.
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C. GATEWAY CoAL AN THE SCOPE OF SECTION 502
Having dispensed with the contract, the Court turned to section 502. The Court acknowledged that section 502 operated as
a statutory exception to a no-strike promise and that "a work
stoppage called solely to protect employees from immediate danger is authorized by § 502 and cannot be the basis for either
a damages award or a Boys Market injunction." 176 It believed,
however, that the court of appeals had read section 502 to encompass an "honest belief" that a hazardous condition exists, "no
matter how unjustified.1177 The Court aligned itself with a narrower reading of the provision, requiring "objective evidence that
such conditions actually obtain. '178 Thus, a good faith belief
would be insufficient in the absence of "ascertainable, objective
evidence supporting [the employees'] conclusion that an abnormally dangerous condition for work exists."'1 79 The nature and
required persuasiveness of such "objective" evidence was not discussed nor did the Court explain why the prior activity of the
foremen was not sufficient.1 80
The appropriate scope of section 502 will be discussed in Part
V of this Article. It is unfortunate that the Gateway Court faced
the issue in an inquiry primarily directed to other questions. The
Court was concerned to limit strikes over arbitrable matters, and
a narrow reading of section 502 was unfortunately consistent
with the thrust of the entire opinion.18 1
The union had read the court of appeals decision to hold that
safety disputes were not arbitrable, and, therefore, no injunction
could lie. Even if safety disputes were arbitrable, the union
argued that the contract negated any no-strike obligation. Thus,
176. 414 U.S. at 385.
177. Id. at 386.

178. Id.
179. Id. at 387, quoting 466 F.2d at 1162 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
It is possible to interpret the Court as requiring only "objective evidence"
supporting the employees' conclusion, rather than evidence proving
that an unsafe condition within section 502 existed in fact. See, e.g.,
Banyard v. NLRB, 505 F.2d 342, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1974). A reading that
objective evidence is required to support only the reasonableness of the

employees' perception would be similar to the view suggested in Part VI
infra. The Court's language, however, makes such a reading problematical. See text accompanying note 178.
180. The Court, for instance, ignored the appellate court's finding
that the nolo contendere pleas were objective criteria.
181. The Court noted that even if section 502 applied, the district
court's order resolved the issue by conditioning the injunction on the suspension of the two foremen pending arbitration. 414 U.S. at 387. The
arbitrator, however, did not effectively determine the scope of section
502.
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although the union found the policy of section 502 favorable to
its position on safety walkouts, it did not stress the role of section 502 as an independent source of protection:
Respondents' fundamental insistence is that this is a contract
case, calling for the purposive construction and application of
a particular bargaining agreement. The contractual provision at
the heart of the case pertains specifically to safety disputes, but
it is not strictly necessary for this Court to consider the special
congressional policies in the area of job safety in order to 8affirm
the right of the Gateway miners to engage in self-help.1 2

The court of appeals had used section 502 only to support its
reverse presumption of arbitrability. Thus, there was no significant analysis of the applicability of section 502 to the walkout
and, hence, no significant analysis of the scope of the provision.
Because there is some doubt concerning the scope of employee self-help under section 502, the union's argument that it
possessed a contractual right to strike was an attempt to protect
a general shutdown. The amicus brief of the AFL-CIO noted
that a work stoppage "to compel the employer to abate the particular unsafe condition" is protected by section 502 only with
respect to those employees directly affected by the health
hazard. 8 3 The brief asserted, however, that the safety hazard
at the Gateway mine did indeed affect all miners. The contention of the UMW throughout was that the matter was not arbitrable. It is doubtful, moreover, that section 502 was considered
at the time of the walkout.18 4
In summary, the Court in Gateway first applied the presumption of arbitrability to safety disputes and permitted the
application of Boys Market in such a case of presumed arbitrability. Second, the Court applied the presumption of Lucas Flour
to find an implied no-strike clause. Third, the Court required
that the contractual right to strike over arbitrable matters be
clear. Finally, the Court read section 502 narrowly.
Gateway is especially poignant for having arisen in the
most dangerous American industry.1 8 5 Coal mining is more dan182. LAw REPRmTs, supra note 161, at 180 (union's brief). See also
id. at 186 (union's brief).
183. Id. at 213-14 n.6.
184. Safety problems at the Gateway mine were discussed by miners
at the 1970 hearings before a Senate subcommittee. Miners complained
of supervisory negligence as well as the failure to test for gas. Hearings
on Health and Safety in the Coal Mines Before the Subcomm. on Labor
of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
27, 351 (1970).
185. See Enterline, Mortality Rates Among Coal Miners, 54 Am. J.
PuB. HEALTH 758 (1964). In 1965 there were over 10,000 reported injuries in bituminous coal fields, resulting in an average of more than 40
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gerous today than it was twenty or thirty years ago. In West
Virginia in 1948, 277 miners out of a work force of 125,669 were
killed; among the 41,573 miners in 1968, there were 152 fatalities.
Twenty years ago, a miner's chance of being killed in West Virginia was one in 453; by 1968, it had increased to one in 273.186
Coal mining takes place in physical surroundings which are
inherently dangerous. 8 7 Nevertheless, safety records developed
in other countries are better than the American average. 8 8 Productivity advances in coal mining have unfortunately had an adverse effect on safety. New mining machinery has meant increased coal dust and a growing incidence of lung disease along
with increased coal production. 8 9 Moreover, safety training in
days lost from work. That same year one man in thirteen was killed
or injured on the job. U.S. BUREAu OF MINES, DEP'T OF TELaoR, INFORaTrioN CnicuLAR No. 8389 (1968).

186. MCATER, supra note 160, at x. According to the same census
data the mortality rates for miners are 1.4 times that for the total male
population for coronary heart disease, 217 times the mortality rate for
stomach cancer, 1.9 times the rate for respiratory cancer, and 4.9 times
the rate for diseases of the respiratory system. Id. Yet, in 1971, the
mining industry showed a return on stockholders' equity of 12 percent,
fifth highest among all industries. FoRTUNE, May 15, 1973, at 207-08.
Even while the mining industry showed a 13 percent production decrease,
it led the list of all industries in its return on sales with 11 percent. It
has been estimated that the general profit margin for the industry ranges
between 12.5 and 15 percent. McAT=ER, supra note 160, at 5.
187. The occupational injury frequency rate for mining is 40.92 injuries per million man-hours compared to 10.55 for all industries. U.S. BuBEAU OF LABOR STATISTIcs, DEP'T OF LABOR, STATisTics (1973).
188. McARER, supra note 160, at 25. Statistics demonstrate that the
largest coal companies are also the largest killers of men, and effectively
refute the belief that accidents occur predominantly in small mines. The

25 largest companies produce over 73 percent of all coal produced in
West Virignia; these companies also account for over 82 percent of all
fatal and 73 percent of all nonfatal accidents. Id. at 24.
189. The relatively high American injury rate for miners occurs in
an industry vastly more productive than counterpartq in West Germany
and England. While the American worker produces twenty tons of coal
per day, miners in Great Britain and West Germany produce three tons.
This productivity is due in large part to mechanization, which causes
safety hazards. Dr. Irving Tabershaw has said:
Increased mining efficiency leads also to increased production of dust, more noise and the generation of more heat at
the coal face. Mining efficiency may well be the cause of the
increased incidence of coal workers' pneumoconiosis which was
noted in U.S. coal miners starting in about 1950. This increase
has been ascribed to better medical diagnosis methods, but it is
more likely due to the fact that there was more exposure to coal
dust from the increased use of mining machinery which began
about that time.
OIL, CHEivrcAL AN AToiVnc Wonmxs' UNION, INFO FOR A LIVABLE INDusT-aL ENVIRONMENT 3 (1974). See also McATEER, supra note 160, at
60.
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the coal industry is inadequate, 10 and the attitude toward accidents remains largely fatalistic."" As Joseph Finley has written:
But the coal miner diei so often. The equipment he takes
with him is not to protect his life, but to pull out more coal.
His overlords have shown through all the history of his digging
an almost total unconcern about preserving his being. Decades
of acceptance have taught him the brooding expectancy of death,
and he has given his willing compliance....
Yet death goes on, as it has in America for all the recorded
time of coal mining. In a century of keeping records, 120,000
men, an average of a hundred human beings every month for
a hundred years, have died violent deaths in coal mines. When
mining was in its primitive stages, men were killed in small
mines grew in size,
numbers in many localized tragedies. As the
so did the capacity to wipe out human life.192
Nor can the Bureau of Mines be relied upon to effectively

enforce mine safety legislation. 93 Even when serious and repeated violations have been found, enforcement has been minimal or nonexistent. 94 The interest of the Bureau of Mines in
safety and health seems secondary to its interest in conservation
and development of mineral resources. 95
The facts of Gateway hardly suggest that strike-happy employees were involved. Although not reported in the Court's
opinion, the mine involved is classified by the Bureau of Mines
as "especially hazardous."' 96 Such a designation under the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act mandates special inspection procedures to ensure the safety of employees. 9 7 The "hazardous" designation refers to large amounts of methane gas produced in the mine, a condition making the operation of the ventilation system critical, since gas, if permitted to accumulate,

could explode from sparks caused, for example, by mechanized
mining machines.
The miners were understandably outraged at the falsification
of the entries on air flow, measurements required by the federal
act within three hours preceding any shift and "before any miner in such shift enters the active workings of a coal mine."' 9
190. McATEER, supra note 160, at 14.
191. Id. at 50.

192. J. FEnLmm, supra note 160, at 206.
193. See R. ScoTr, Muscrx AND BLOoD 204-35 (1974).
194. See, e.g., J. FiNLry, supra note 160, at 210-12; McA'mz, supra
note 160, at 190-202.
195. McAmmi, supra note 160, at 197, 208, table 12.
196.

LAW EPR= , supra note 161, at 142 (union's brief).

197. 30 U.S.C. § 813 (i) (1970).
198. Id. § 861(d) (1).
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The company had recognized the dangerous condition by initially
withdrawing the work force. The miners subsequently voted to
refuse to work under the foremen involved, a decision apparently
based in part on past safety grievances, 199 and the walkout occurred after the suspended foremen were reinstated. The right
to refuse to work with certain employees, especially in construction, has traditionally been recognized under the NLRA. 200 The
question is whether an "enlightened society" will penalize similar
refusals when miners refuse to work under supervisors whose
attitude toward safety is indifferent at best.
V. THE DEFINITION OF ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS
WORKING CONDITIONS
The critical language of section 502 provides that
the quitting of labor by an employee or employees in good faith
because of abnormally dangerous conditions for work at the
place of employment of such employee or employees [shall not]
be deemed a strike under this [Act].201
The interpretive questions under this section which have received
the greatest administrative and judicial attention involve the operational role of the "good faith" standard and its relationship
to "abnormally dangerous conditions."
In the absence of clear legislative history,202 the most logical
reading of the statute would require a motivational test-the
employees must in good faith believe the condition to be abnormally dangerous-and a causal test-the perceived condition must
be the cause of the walkout. The motivational test overcomes
the fear of "unwarranted" interference with production. The
causal test is aimed at avoiding a walkout, purportedly in response to an unsafe work environment, but in fact motivated by
other concerns. Whether the work condition is dangerous in fact
would not seem to be relevant; to invoke the protection of the
statute it would be sufficient that the employees (1) in good faith
believe conditions to be abnormally hazardous and (2) walk out
because of those conditions. It may be difficult, of course, to
199. LAw REaRnqrs, supra note 161, at 145 n.2 (union's brief).
200. See, e.g., § 8(e), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (e) (1970) (construction industry proviso).
201. 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1970) (emphasis added).
202. There is apparently no legislative history of section 502. The
original H.R. 3020 did not include the section; it was introduced without
significant discussion in the Senate.
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but similar determinations
prove what in fact caused a walkout,
203
are required in other contexts.
The suggested reading of section 502 does not require the
employees' belief to be correct or even reasonable, although the
unreasonableness of the belief would certainly cast substantial
doubt upon the employees' good faith. The good faith criterion,
like other "state of mind" criteria, is based in large part upon
reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence. The actual dangerousness of the work condition, then, is relevant to the determination, at least to the extent that such evidence tends to show
the reasonableness of the employees' perceptions. The employees
must perceive "abnormal" dangerousness. The requirement of
such a perception is a further protection against pretextual walkouts.

A requirement that the employees be correct in their belief
that the work condition is abnormally dangerous would substantially undercut the obvious purpose of section 502. The section
assumes that employees may refuse to work when abnormally
hazardous conditions are perceived and provides protection,
partly because such action is reasonably foreseeable and partly
out of humanitarian considerations. No real function would be
served by the subsequent penalizing of employees who erroneously act out of a good faith belief that a condition is dangerous.
Requiring an accurate evaluation, later to be tested by an admini-

strative or judicial tribunal, would place the employee in an untenable and unfair position. 20 4 Dangerousness in fact can often
be determined only from scientific information and the opinions
of experts, evidence not available to employees at the times they
must decide whether to engage in self-help or subject themselves

to a perceived danger.

A. INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 502
The proposed reading of section 502 was seemingly adopted
in an early decision in the Sixth Circuit. In NLRB U. Knight
203. Thus, for instance, the cause of strikes said to violate sections
8(b) (4), 8(b) (7), or 8(d) of the NLRA must be determined.
204. Unfortunately, some provisions of the NLRA do require employees to act at their peril. Thus, although employees have the right to
respect a picket line, they must correctly judge the legality of the picket
line. Similarly, a strike in response to an unfair labor practice of the
employer is protected even in the face of a no-strike clause but, apparently, only if the employees correctly evaluate the legality of the employer's conduct. See Getman, The Protection of Economic Pressure by
Section 7 of the NLRA, 115 U. PA. L. Ray. 1195 (1967).
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Morley Corp.,20 5 the court held that a subjective belief in the
abnormal dangerousness of the challenged working conditions
was sufficient to invoke the protection of section 502.200 There
was apparently no question that the uncomfortable conditions
were indeed the cause of the walkout.
Unfortunately, recent decisions have rejected this reading of
section 502. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, for
example, has required an "objective" test for abnormally dan-8
20 7
and the NLRB has followed suit.1
gerous working conditions,
The "objective" test thus recognizes a third requirement in the
consideration of employee action: the employees must be correct
in their belief that the situation is abnormally dangerous. Therefore, employees act with the risk that a later tribunal, not affected by the "heat" of the situation or personally endangered
by the peril, will find the danger only "normal." This reading,
however, effectively ignores the good faith requirement. If the
situation is in fact abnormally dangerous, there is little need to
determine if employees actually believed in good faith that it was
dangerous. Since the employees must in any event prove that
their walkout was in fact "because of" the dangerous condition,
good faith could be presumed. Indeed, there would be little need
to prove even a causal connection between the walkout and the
perceived condition, unless one assumes that employees who face
a condition in fact abnormally dangerous will walk out for some
other reason. As a matter of reasonable interpretation, "good
faith" is the critical term; the prepositional phrase, "because of
... " refers to the necessary causal relationship between the
perception and the activity.
In Knight Morley a breakdown occurred in the blower system of a plant buffing room. The blower was required by state
law to carry off dust from emery wheels, grinders, and other
machinery. A series of difficulties resulted in the morning shift
of buffers being sent home after only two hours of work. After
some repair work, the blower still blew dirt, grit, and abrasives
205. 251 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 927 (1958).
206. An objective test could conceivably have led to the same result,
since the humidity, dust, and heat affecting the employees was caused
at least in part by the malfunctioning of a ventilation blower required
by state law.
207. NLRB v. Fruin-Colnon Constr. Co., 330 F.2d 885 (8th Cir. 1964).
208. See, e.g., Anaconda Aluminum Co., 197 N.L.R.B. 336 (1972);
Stop & Shop, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 75, 76 n.3 (1966); Curtis Mathes M_.fg.
Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 473 (1963); Redwing Carriers, Inc., 130 N.L.R.B. 1208
(1961).
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into the operators' faces. In addition, the weather was hot and
humid; the thermometer inside the buffing room indicated 110
degrees.
If the buffers had not been represented by a union, a walkout
at this point would clearly have been protected activity under
section 7. 209 There was union representation, however, and the
collective bargaining agreement contained a no-strike clause.
Thus, section 502, which excludes safety stoppages from the coverage of no-strike clauses, became relevant in determining the
protected nature of the work stoppage. 210
The buffers on the afternoon shift complained through their
union representatives, but were informed that work must consubsequently
tinue on pain of discharge. All seventeen buffers
211
discharged.
were
and
plant
the
of
walked out
The NLRB found the walkout protected under section 502
212
and thus not a "strike" under the contractual no-strike clause.
The concerted activity, therefore, fell under the general umbrella
of protection provided by section 7.213 The Board found that the
work situation was abnormally dangerous because of the "danger of 'heat disease' and the physical ailments which the 'dust'
would and did cause." 214 The fact that no one contracted "heat
disease" was not deemed dispositive, since the walkout itself may
have prevented such occurrences. Although the good faith of
the employees would have been supported by the fact that they
requested amelioration of the dusty condition, suggested how
that could be achieved, and walked out only when the company
refused to correct the faulty fan, the NLRB seemed confident
that abnormally dangerous conditions existed in fact, and the
good faith of the strikers was therefore not relied upon as the
209. NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962); NLRB

v. Southern Silk Mills, 209 F.2d 155 (6th Cir. 1953).
210. Of course, even without section 502, which applies only to
strikes in response to abnormally dangerous conditions, the no-strike
clause could be read to exclude stoppages in relation to merely unsafe
working conditions. The influence of section 502, however, may retard
such a development of federal common law under section 301.
211. On the following day, the blower was repaired when the company, responding to suggestions made by employees the day before, reversed the blower wires.
212. Knight Morley Corp., 116 N.L.R.B. 140 (1956).
213. See United Auto Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949); NLRB v. Kohler Co., 220 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1955);
Getman, supra note 192. See also Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n v.
NLRB, 330 F.2d 492 (3d Cir. 1964), aff'g 138 N.L.R.B. 737 (1962).
214. 116 N.L.R.B. at 144.
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basic consideration. 215 Member Rodgers, however, felt compelled
to write a concurring opinion, stressing that a subjective standard
would be insufficient under section 502.216
Although there is much stress on the "good faith" standard
of section 502 in the affirming opinion of the court of appeals,
the decision does not represent an unequivocal reliance upon a
"subjective" test; there is some indication that objective evidence
of "hazardousness" was required. In response to the employer's
challenge to the testimony of employees as to the condition of
the buffing room and to the testimony of an industrial health
expert that conditions were abnormally dangerous, the court
held that (1) employees were competent to testify as to the
physical conditions they had observed and (2) an industrial hygienist was competent to testify about the health dangers involved.21 7 The discussion was aimed at the competence of particular kinds of testimony; the relevance of objective evidence was
not doubted, and there was evidence that hazardous conditions
in fact existed. Although the court concluded that the conditions
"might reasonably [have been] considered 'abnormally dangerous,'" the context suggests that the court may have been referring to the weight of the evidence of hazardousness rather than
suggesting that reasonable belief was sufficient.2 1 8
Despite these ambiguities, Knight Morley is often cited as authority for the subjective test of good faith. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit itself, in its Gateway decision, cited
Knight Morley for the proposition that "a refusal to work because of good faith apprehension of physical danger is protected
activity and not enjoinable."2 9 The dissenter, however, cited
Knight Morley to support his belief that section 502 required "objective evidence supporting [the union's] conclusion that an
abnormally dangerous condition for work exists. '22 0 Finally, the
decision was cited as authority for the Supreme Court's Gate221
way holding that "objective evidence" is required.
The Board's oft-cited interpretation of section.502 in Redwing
Carriers,Inc., 222 is also not free from ambiguity. The Board re215.
216.

Id.
Id. at 154.

217. NLRB v. Knight Morley Corp., 251 F.2d 753, 758-59 (6th Cir.
1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 927 (1958).
218. Id. at 759.
219. 466 F.2d at 1160.
220. Id. at 1162 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
221. 414 U.S. at 387.
222. 130 N.L.R.B. 1208 (1961).
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jected the argument that "the state of mind of the employee or
employees concerned" was controlling and held that the proper
test was "whether the actual working conditions shown to exist
by competent evidence might in the circumstances reasonably be
223
If the "actual working
considered 'abnormally dangerous.' ,,
conditions" must only be "reasonably" considered abnormally
dangerous, then the Board would seem to have adopted the very
"subjective" test it purported to reject. 224 The Board's decision,
however, relied upon an express finding that abnormally dangerous conditions did in fact exist, and separated this issue from
the question of the employees' "good faith." In Redwing Carriers, then, the Board seems to have adopted an interpretation
requiring more than subjective good faith, despite the rather
vague language of its opinion.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has also rejected a subjective test, thus forcing employees to act at their peril,
an unhappily ironic result given the purpose of section 502. In
NLRB v. Fruin-Colnon Construction Co., 225 employees had been
working to widen a vertical shaft from the top of a mountain
to a horizontal tunnel several hundred feet below. Employees
considered the footing dangerous because of wetness and an updraft in the shaft. For this reason, employees refused to go down
the shaft on the day in question. The court found the work "hazardous," but not "abnormally hazardous," and found that the
evidence failed to demonstrate that the employees' good faith
belief was in fact correct.
The facts illustrate the inhumanity of the objective test. The
work was part of a hydroelectric project to be used by a utility
company. There was to be a reservior on the top of a mountain,
and the shaft in which the employees were working was located
in the basin of the planned reservoir. Their work consisted of
enlarging the entire shaft through the use of dynamite. The
holes for blasting were so drilled that the floor of the widened
shaft sloped downward toward the narrow pilot hole to aid the
fall of blasted rock to the horizontal tunnel below. As the shaft
was widened, workers would be lowered in a cage or open
elevator.
Concurrently with the widening of the shaft, construction
of the reservoir on top of the mountain involved the erection
223. Id. at 1209.
224. Redwing cited as authority both the court of appeals and
NLRB decisions in Knight Morley. Id. n.3. See Banyard v. NLRB, 505
F.2d 342, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
225. 330 F.2d 885 (8th Cir. 1964).
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of a large dike or wall of rock. The rock and soil for the dike,
obtained from the leveling of the mountain, were continually
dumped from large trucks along the course of the dike. While
the loads were being dumped, two sluicing monitors compacted
the dike by continually washing the dumped material with large
quantities of water. Work on the dike progressed in close proximity to the shaft in which the miners were working.
The preceding shift of miners reported that conditions were
"rough." A boulder had been seen rolling from the dike and
striking the crane that operated the cage in the shaft. The temperature that morning at the top of the shaft was 29 degrees, the
coldest since the widening began. Although the crew was reluctant to proceed, supervisors inspected the base of the widened
shaft and ordered work to proceed. Work was hampered by water gushing down the shaft and seeping out of the walls above
the miners' heads. There was also a strong updraft from the
pilot hole, which caused the falling water, mixed with dirt and
mud from the walls and floor of the shaft, to blow back up to
the top deck of the cage and spray the men on the lower section
of the cage. Miners found it difficult to drill dynamite holes
and maintain a safe footing on the sloped floor. After 20 minutes
of work, the men returned to the surface to warm and dry themselves and asked for temporary work elsewhere or, in the alternative, for the temporary halting of the rock dumping and sluicing
operation. The stoppage led to the termination of their employment.
The employer admitted that the work in the shaft was "hazardous under the best conditions, 22 6 but noted that other miners
had worked in the shaft both before and after the work stoppage.
The trial examiner found that the work was abnormally dangerous, 227 defined as "deviating from the normal condition or from
the norm or average," a finding he held to be objectively supported.2 2 8 Thus, the protected nature of the walkout turned only
on those events which made the critical day substantially more
dangerous than usual. This reading of section 502 limits its usefulness as a tool in achieving safe environments but is probably
required by the language of the provision.2 29 The trial examiner
226.
227.
228.
229.
eration
aminer

Fruin-Colnon Constr. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 894, 903 (1962).
Id., citing Redwing Carriers, Inc., 130 N.L.R.B. 1208 (1961).
Id. at 904-05.
The result is that the trial examiner must exclude from considevidence that the work was generally unsafe. Thus, the trial exdid not consider evidence that the cage and attached harnesses
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did not place great weight on the fact that later shifts had worked in the shaft since those employees "might have been motivated to assume the risks involved to avoid termination of their
jobs." 23 0 This response was supported by the evidence, indicating
that some employees will work in situations which a tribunal
will later find to be objectively hazardous.
The court of appeals refused to uphold the reinstatement order. 231 After a detailed review of the facts, the court held that

the trial examiner had unreasonably inferred "abnormally dangerous" circumstances from the record as a whole. The court's
detailed review of the evidence and its findings at variance with
those of the trial examiner make painfully apparent the difficulties of the "objective approach." The General Counsel, the trial
examiner, and the NLRB were convinced that the evidence demonstrated abnormally dangerous conditions in fact, but the court
disagreed. No one disputed the good faith of the employees.
Three of the four complainants had long experience with mining
and the dangers of water, and all four had worked in other
phases of the mining operation.
The court agreed that the work was hazardous, involving "inherent, uncontrollable perils.

'232

Nevertheless, the work of em-

ployees prior and subsequent to the shift in question helped to
convince the court that the "record as a whole" did not support
the Board's findings. How the hazard was made less than2 a3abnormal by the failure of others to object was not made clear.

The court distinguished Knight Morley, involving a clearly
less frightening situation, because of the presence of expert testimony in that case, 234 although the Act does not require a particular source of evidence relating to working conditions. Indeed,
the court was quite willing to make its own safety findings, inconsistent with those of experienced miners whose safety had
been at stake. Expressing doubt that Knight Morley held good
faith to be sufficient to invoke section 502, the court stated unequivocally that the employees' good faith would not be suffiwere unsafe. 139 N.L.R.B. at 899 n.19. See also Curtis Mathes Mfg. Co.,
145 N.L.R.B. 493 (1963).
230. 139 N.L.R.B. at 905.
231. 330 F.2d at 885.
232. Id. at 891.
233. Nor does the danger seem normal because only a small number
of employees walk out. See Curtis Mathes Mfg. Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 473,
475 n.4 (1963). The court apparently gave some weight to the fact that
the employer took some safety precautions and awarded extra compensa-

tion for the work.

234. 330 F.2d at 892.
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cient "should proof later of the physical facts fail to support [the
2 35
employees'] prior belief.
The court's primary concern is perhaps best illustrated by
the statement that employees "run the risk of discharge ... for
participating in the unprotected activity of dictating to management their own terms and conditions of employment."2 3 Apparently, if the employees' good faith belief were supported by the
"physical facts," they would no longer be "dictating" to management. The bugaboo of "dictation" by employees runs through
many of the judicial opinions relating to wildcat activity and
safety walkouts but generally has little basis in the facts of particular cases. This is especially true in Fruin-Colnon. The employees had asked for temporary reassignment or the halting of
operations they felt were interfering with their work as well as
endangering their lives.
A similar concern commonly asserted is that the adoption
of a subjective test would open "the door to 'quickie' work stoppages and walkouts at any time the employees so desire by the
23 7
expedient of claiming that conditions of work are unsuitable."
But the fear that the claimed "abnormally dangerous" condition
is an "expedient" should be overcome by the requirement of a
causal connection. The real risk is not expedience or pretext,
but that employees who in good faith believe that abnormally
dangerous conditions exist and who stop work because of this
fear will later be proved wrong. This is the only situation protected by the subjective test but not by the objective test. Moreover, the choice seems clear between the risk that employees
will erroneously, albeit in good faith, believe conditions to be abnormally dangerous and the risk that the fear of job loss will motivate them to continue to work in danger. There is little threat
to economic stability in the subjective approach; employees do
not generally enjoy strikes 238 or frivolously contemplate the risk
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Knight Morley Corp., 116 N.L.R.B. 140, 154 (1956) (Member
Rodgers, concurring).
238. The Steelworkers have set out to obtain contract rights to "refuse without penalty to work under unsafe and unhealthy conditions."
Statement by Ben Fischer, Director, Contract Administration, United
Steelworkers, cited in NADER, supra note 9, at 228. The aim is not only
to secure protection from discharge, which is all that section 502 allows,
but also to guarantee the right to pay or to transfer to another job when
work time would be lost because of the hazards of the regular job. The
right has been granted in a number of Steelworker collective bargaining
agreements, but workers act at their peril in identifying an unsafe condi-
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of job loss. The very factor relied upon by the Fruin-Colnon
court, the work by later shifts of employees, suggests that employees will often trade wages and job security for safety. The
paucity of section 502 cases suggests that there is little compelling
reason to restrict the scope of the section.
The objective test, moreover, places weight on expert testimony which for obvious reasons is more available to the employer than to the protesting employees. 23 9 The critical moment
in safety disputes is when employees are faced with a dangerous condition, a time when no "experts," or perhaps only the
employer's experts, are available. There is little in policy or fairness to justify the Hobson's choice of working, thereby possibly
risking life or limb, or stopping work, thereby risking loss of
employment because a later trier of fact finds that the "physical
facts" do not support the employees' belief. The problem is one
not so much of logic as of simple humanity. The problem is
made more serious, and unfair, by reliance upon experts in an
24
area where little is known and one side has greater resources. 1
If the standard is objective, and the Board has recently reaffirmed this position, 241 the character and quantum of proof required to establish that abnormally dangerous conditions existed
is the next question that must be addressed. Because of the wide
tion over and above the normal hazards of the job. NADER, supra note

9, at 229.
239. The Board has upheld a trial examiner's finding, based in part
upon the testimony of a safety engineer employed by the employer's
insurance carrier, that abnormally dangerous conditions did not exist.
Stop & Shop, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 75, 76 n.3 (1966), affd sub nom. Machaby
v. NLRB, 377 F.2d 59 (1st Cir. 1967). See also Philadelphia Marine
Trade Ass'n, 138 N.L.R.B. 737 (1962), aff'd 330 F.2d 492 (3d Cir. 1964).
240. See, e.g., Myers Indus. Elec., 71 L.R.R.M. 1425 (1969). The facts
in Curtis Mathes Mfg. Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 473 (1963), were strikingly similar to Knight Morley where the Board had found abnormally dangerous
conditions to exist. The most significant difference from Knight Morley
was the absence of expert testimony relating to the health hazard. In
Curtis Mathes the evidence showed that the shutdown of the dust suction
system in a woodworking plant caused thick and unpleasant dust conditions, made breathing difficult, and decreased visibility, adding to the
danger of operating certain machines. Company witnesses admitted that
the conditions were probably as "unpleasant" as they had ever been in
the plant.
The trial examiner stressed that the statute dealt with danger, not
discomfort. The dangers caused by dust, however, are not completely
unknown, and a concentration which hampers visibility and breathing
is more serious than mere discomfort. See NLRB v. Knight Morley, 251
F.2d 753, 758-59 (6th Cir. 1957) (discussion of expert testimony). See
generally STELLMAN, supranote 9, at 22-28, 167-83.
241. Anaconda Aluminum Co., 197 N.L.R.B. 336 (1972).
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range of types of work and their relative "safety," it would be
difficult to find a general norm from which to determine deviations. The Board has assumed that abnormal danger refers to
danger in excess of the norm in the particular workplace. Thus,
usual work dangers will not be sufficient to protect the stoppage.
Inquiry will tend to focus on the precise time the walkout occurred. Many walkouts, however, are caused by pent up grievances, with the immediate cause being a particular perception
242
of danger.
If the danger must be "abnormal," it will be necessary to
inquire into the "normal dangers" of the workplace. In the case
of the miners in Fruin-Colnon, there was no question that the
work was inherently dangerous, but the actions of the miners
themselves suggest that the danger had increased. The court of
appeals, however, relied upon the inherent danger of the work
to overrule the Board.243 The work of employees before and after the stoppage as well as the employer's alleged safety precautions were used to show that the hazard was not abnormal. This
approach is similar to the tort notion of assumption of risk and
makes it difficult to apply section 502 in dangerous occupations.
Courts may be so impressed by the "normal" hazards of particular work that "abnormal" conditions become impossible to
prove. In fact, however, employees' acceptance and performance
of normally risky employment might strengthen the implication
that their concern for their safety at a time of perceived abnor244
mal danger is indeed genuine.
Going even further in Anaconda Aluminum Co.,245 the Board
has apparently required circumstances which "change the character of the danger." A molten metal operation, the Board stated,
was recognized and accepted by employees as inherently dangerous and did not become " 'abnormally dangerous' merely because
employee patience with prevailing conditions wears thin or
their forbearance ceases."24 6 The employees are said to have
242. See Atleson, Work Group Behavior and Wildcat Strikes: The
Causes and Functions of Industrial Civil Disobedience, 34 Onto ST. L.J.
750 (1973).
243. 330 F.2d at 891.
244. The employees in Fruin-Colnon did not technically strike but
rather asked to be assigned to work in the tunnel, which, as indicated
by the identical premium pay for such work, was also recognized as hazardous. Indeed, the employees were willing to continue working in the
shaft if the employer would discontinue the sluicing and dumping operations adjacent to the mouth of the shaft. 139 N.L.R.B. at 905.
245. 197 N.L.R.B. 336 (1972).
246. Id. at 344, citing NLRB v. Fruin-Colnon Constr. Co., 330 F.2d
885 (3d Cir. 1964).
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"accepted" their lot by not striking or quitting. As the cases
demonstrate, however, striking involves great risks, and the incidence of strikes over perceived safety hazards is not known. Yet
the more dangerous the work, the less hope employees have of
convincing a tribunal that the particular situation was abnormally hazardous. The fact that no prior walkouts have occurred
is surely not the kind of "objective evidence" of danger one would
expect to be required by the courts in these cases. It is hard
to see how this information is more relevant than the perceptions and good faith of the employees involved. Finally, while
the Board expresses its disdain for a stoppage, even in good faith,
caused "merely" by the ceasing of employee patience or forbearance, it is unclear why employees must act immediately or forfeit
the opportunity under a statute protecting walkouts over abnormally dangerous conditions at the place of work. The good faith
test requires in part a causal link, and there is no inherent reason
why forbearance should imply forfeiture. The problem, of
course, stems from the adverb "abnormally," but since the motivation for the provision must have been concern for safety and
health, there seems little reason to use an unsafe work situation against employees. Thus, although there had always been
a danger of explosions at Anaconda, and indeed some explosions
had occurred, it does not follow that a situation which may increase the chance of an explosion does not create abnormal danger. Abnormal danger does indeed include a situation which increases the likelihood of harm from the "inherent risks" of the
shop. It is not the characterof the danger which must change,
but ratherthe likelihood of harm.
The problem is highlighted by the case continually cited by
the Board as a clear statement of the objective test. In Redwing
Carriers,Inc.,24 7 seven truckers of a common carrier refused to
cross a picket line. The alleged abnormal danger was the risk
of injury in crossing the line. A number of the drivers had been
threatened and one was handled roughly after calling the carrier
for instructions. A subsequent state court injunction directed
against some of the picketers was predicated on violent acts committed on the picket line. The threats, however, were insufficient to convince the Board that abnormally dangerous condi248
tions existed.
247. 130 N.L.R.B. 1208 (1961).
248. Id. at 1211. The Board seems to have given weight to the fact
that between the employees' refusal and the end of the strike, the carrier
hauled 1800 loads in or out of the struck plant. Id. at 1211. As the
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The detailed findings of the trial examiner demonstrate the
extent to which the employees bore the brunt of the emotion
involved in the strike and, perhaps, the inability of law enforcement officers to provide protection. 249 The trial examiner found
that the refusal to cross the picket line was protected. Although
the threat to safety and health was only "sporadic and uncertain," not continuous as in Knight Morley, the trial examiner
held that the subjective good faith of the drivers was sufficient
to bring them within section 502. Rejecting the subjective test,
the Board stated that the "actual working conditions shown to
exist by competent evidence might in the circumstances reasonably be considered 'abnormally dangerous.' ",250
Even under an "objective" test, there clearly was a risk of
harm above that faced by truck drivers normally, or perhaps
even when crossing picket lines. The "sporadic" character of the
threats does not decrease the danger but, as any guerrilla knows,
merely increases the terror. The Board, however, seemed to
treat the norm as a strike situation in which some disorder is
not unusual. 251 Although a clear determination would have re252
quired further elucidation, the Board provided none.
The poignancy of the Redwing situation is further increased
by the fact that the truckers were not bound by a collective bargaining agreement, and therefore were not hindered by a nostrike clause. Thus, technically, the broad protections afforded
by section 7, not those of section 502, were at issue. 2r3 The Board
held that employees who refuse to perform their jobs engage in
unprotected activity. It has since been established, however, that
trial examiner stated in Fruin-Colnon,however, surely "Section 502 of
the Act does not require that someone be killed or seriously injured before conditions of work can be regarded as abnormally dangerous." 139
N.L.R.B. at 905. The subsequent work without injury could be "pure
happen-stance."
249. Although police did escort trucks through the picket lines,
trucks had previously been stopped by large groups of strikers. One
driver was stopped by pickets and informed that it would be "healthy"
if he turned around. Sometime after the employees refused to cross the
picket line, "substantial" damage was done to the employer's equipment
by nails and thrown objects. Threats continued, other drivers were assaulted, and at least one driver was shot. 130 N.L.R.B. at 1210-11.
250. Id. at 1209.
251. See Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 107 F.2d 472, 479 (3d Cir.
1939).
252. See 130 N.L.R.B. at 1211.
253. The trial examiner held the actions of the employees to be concerted activities in the sense that the employees were seeking conditions
of employment that would not require them to cross picket lines in the
face of violence. Id. at 1215.
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employees may refuse to cross a picket line under section 7, un-

less restricted by a no-strike clause, since this is activity for "mu2 4
tual aid or protection."75

B. ANALYSIS OF THE STANDAR: THE DETERRENCE FUNcTION
As noted by one trial examiner, the objective test of the
NLRB "places a heavy burden on employees, who must act with-

out the benefit of medical advice and whose choice places either
their jobs or their health in jeopardy.255 To paraphrase the appellate court in Gateway, no enlightened society should require such a choice. Moreover, there is no reason to interpret
section 502 in this way, despite the Supreme Court's acceptance
of the "objective" approach in Gateway. Since there is no legislative history relevant to section 502, the proper interpretation
of the section must be based upon sound policy as well as correct grammar.
The objective test penalizes employees who cannot subsequently convince a tribunal that conditions were objectively
dangerous, even if they succeed in establishing a good faith
belief in such abnormal danger and a causal relationship between
the belief and the walkout. The result is to penalize employees
for a lack of knowledge about industrial disease and safety which
they cannot realistically be expected to possess. Moreover, unless they have the resources to consult with industrial hygienists, there is little chance that such evidence will be provided,
unless it is provided by company witnesses. In any event, experts can only base their conclusions on the situation they believe
to have existed at the time of the alleged hazardous condition,
and this will be primarily provided by employees and their supervisors. The testimony of employees and employer representatives will no doubt conflict. Even if the trier of fact believes
the employees' version of events, and the expert has indicated
that such a situation was abnormally dangerous, there would be
little reason not to have simply relied on the employees' evidence
in the first place. The inquiry proceeds in an air of unrealitythe walkout has already occurred and the employees have already placed their jobs on the line. There is little policy justification for determining the job status of employees on the basis
254. NLRB v. Union Carbide Corp., 440 F.2d 54 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826 (1971). The court held, ironically, that the protection
does not apply to employees who refuse to cross a picket line because
of fear rather than solidarity.
255. Curtis Mathes Mfg. Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 473, 482 n.6 (1963).
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of information not known to them-and not realistically available-at the critical time.
To the extent that the law affects the behavior of employees,
the "objective" approach will encourage them to choose wages
and job security over safety and health. The facts in the cases
demonstrate that many employees already make that choice,256
but there is no reason why the law should encourage it.
There is little evidence that application of the "subjective"
test, a test more in keeping with the language of section 502,
would result in economic disturbance sufficient to overbalance
the health and safety interests of employees. Employees do not
257
lightly strike and risk loss of pay, discharge, or discipline.
Despite the arguments raised in favor of the more stringent
"objective" test, the factual correctness of the employees' perceptions does not guarantee their good faith or totally avoid
the risk of a pretextual walkout. The objective test does, however, operate to penalize employees who act in good faith but
who are "objectively" wrong about the safety hazard. Moreover,
there is no clear relationship between the economic cost of the
walkout to the employer and the choice between the subjective
and objective tests. Similarly, the choice of tests has no necessary relationship to the importance of the particular work to the
overall production process.
The arguments in support of the objective test stress the
chaos and anarchy that would result if employees could choose
when to work. Implicit in this fear is the assumption that employees do indeed face job dangers but are not capable of discerning when they face these dangers. This assumption denigrates the integrity of workers and implies class-based notions
about workers and their proper status. Although these notions
are not expressed, they are consistent with and implicit in the
arguments made.
Another objection to a "subjective" approach is based on
alleged administrative problems. The Gateway Court stated that
if no "objective evidence" is required, courts face a wholly speculative inquiry into the motives of workers. 258 Of course, no test
would exclude objective evidence, and even under the "subjec256. I am aware of a situation in a steel plant where particular jobs
were avoided for years because of perceived hazards, only to become the
source of competitive struggle when an arbitration settlement determined that bonuses should attach to those jobs.
257. See Atleson, supra note 242.
258. 414 U.S. at 386.
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tive" test, good faith would be evidenced by the situation at the
time of the walkout. Like other sections of the NLRA, notably
sections 8 (a) (3) and 8 (a) (5),259 states of mind are shown by the
circumstances existing at the critical time. Indeed, the analogy
indicates that such inquiries are neither "wholly speculative" nor
novel. The fear that courts would have to accept the "naked
assertion of an employee that the presence of one of his fellow
employees in a plant constitutes a safety hazard" 260 assumes
somehow that the suggested test depends upon "naked" assertions.
The reasons for such hyperbole are not fully explained but
seem to flow from a feeling that industrial relations cannot
otherwise be conducted efficiently. Evidence to support this notion is apparently not required. The disdain for employees who
might make "naked assertions" that their life or health is in danger is clear. Surely it will be difficult to prove good faith on
the part of strikers when it is supported only by "naked assertions" or "attitudes, fancies, and whim." The subjective test,
however, requires more than mere whims or fancies.
It is not at all clear that the more stringent test is required
by the "public policy favoring arbitration and peaceful resolution of labor disputes.12 6 1 Arbitration is not necessarily inconsistent with the right to strike. Some agreements expressly pre-

serve the right to strike over certain types of disputes, and section 502 itself permits strikes in certain circumstances. Moreover, arbitration is not necessarily the most appropriate forum
for safety disputes. The burden of seeking "peaceful resolution of
labor disputes" when employees face a safety or health hazard
should not be placed upon the employee. Employees cannot reasonably be expected to blithely accept the danger and file a griev2 62
ance in every case.
The point which needs to be stressed is that employees can
be expected to balk when they believe in good faith that safety
hazards exist, regardless of which legal test is recognized. The
only reason to punish objectively unfounded reasonable behavior
is to protect the orderly flow of production by making employees
259. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) (3), (a)(5) (1970).
260. Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 466 F.2d 1157, 1162
(3d Cir. 1972) (Rosenn, J., dissenting), cited in 414 U.S. at 386 n.16.
261. 414 U.S. at 386.
262. Employees often do not see the grievance process as a beneficial method of dispute resolution. The process is often long, and employees may perceive that management will somehow retaliate. See, e.g.,
R. Scor, MuscLE AND BLOOD 164-66 (1974).
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think seriously before walking out. This aim is hardly sufficient
to support the objective test. In an earlier article I noted that
wildcat strikes are rarely whimsical events; employees do not
lightly decide to strike, even with union authorization. 2 3 The
flow of production is adequately protected from whimsical strikes
by the requirement of good faith and the need to show that the
walkout did result from the perception of abnormal hazards.
Although the objective test may in theory deter even protected walkouts, the actual behavior of employees may not be
affected by either knowledge or concern for applicable rules of
law. It is difficult to believe that the objective test will necessarily deter walkouts when employees reasonably fear threats to
their safety or health. The lack of deterrent effect is even more
obvious in safety disputes, whether the walkout is authorized by
2 4
the union or not, than it is in nonsafety wildcat situations.
Thus, the objective test cannot be expected to encourage walkouts
only when conditions are in fact abnormally dangerous. This is
especially true because expert advice will rarely be available at
the critical moment.
The problems of threats to health are considerably greater
than those of physical safety hazards; there may be long latency
periods for health impairments, and existing causes may be hard
to identify. For example, the effects of working with mercury,
uranium, or vinyl chloride may not appear for many years, and
current findings may represent only the tip of the iceberg. One
implication is that workers will tend to walk out only when the
threat to them is very clear-thus, section 502 cases will primarily represent only those situations where health and safety
threats are immediately perceivable. Even a broad reading of
section 502, then, would only protect a portion of those employees facing real hazards.
The burden placed on employees by the objective test should
be viewed in light of the paucity of information and studies concerning workplace safety and health. In determining whether
a situation is abnormally dangerous, to what body of knowledge
can an employee quickly turn? Is a noise level of 100 decibels
abnormally dangerous? What about 70 parts per million of carbon monoxide? Privately set standards exist for only a handful
of chemicals and substances, and federal action under OSIA has
263. Atleson, supra note 242.
264. Id. at 809.
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been painfully slow. Furthermore, the privately set standards
are often regarded as arbitrary, obsolete, or based on inadequate
scientific inquiry. 26 5 Since both private and public standards are
"consensus" standards, they generally represent political compro266
mises rather than scientifically set safety guidelines.
A recent study by Doctors John Peters and Richard Monson
of the Harvard School of Public Health points out the hazards.
In a study of two plastics plants they found that the number
of cancer deaths over a 26-year span was 50 percent higher
than could be expected from a comparable group of American
males. 2 17 The incidence of liver cancer was found to be ten times
268
The rehigher than that expected in the general population.
ported incidence of cancer deaths of workers in the plastics industry has soared in recent years, and the current findings suggest that studies of other industries could uncover similar horrors. The latency period of exposure to vinyl chloride could extend well beyond 20 years, and thus its full cancer-causing potential may not be known for several years.
Although there is a relatively well defined basis for industrial safety, the study of industrial health is in its infancy, and
the extent and incidence of occupational disease is not known.
Although some industrial substances are known to be carcinogenic, it is not known how many workers die each year from
cancer resulting from long exposure to particular substances.
269
Even the number of hazardous substances in use is unknown.
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH) estimates that there are 15,000 hazardous substances
in use, but this is based on an admittedly partial list. In addition,
hundreds of new substances are annually introduced into work
environments although little, if anything, is known about their
potential effects. There is, furthermore, the enormous problem
of determining the effect of exposure over many years, especially
when the effects of these substances are combined with each
2 70
All these difother or with other environmental influences.
standobjective
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See WALLICK, supra note 9.
266. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
267. AFL-CIO News, July 6, 1974, at 8.
268. Id.
265.
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MALLNo, supra note 14, at 25.
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SAFETY AND HEALTH STANDARDS AND THE OBJECTIVE TEST:

THE RoLE or OSHA
If the objective test is considered to be the proper standard
under section 502, then existing state and federal safety and
health regulations should be used to define "abnormally dangerous conditions for work."2 71 The passage of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970272 should result in standards
whose violations would provide the objective evidence required
to invoke section 502. Although the Act does not create private
remedies for work stoppages, the Supreme Court in Mastro Plazstics furnished an analogy for permitting safety violations to trigger section 502 walkouts. The Court noted that when employees
are faced with an employer's illegal conduct, the rejection of selfhelp measures in favor of the unfair labor practice procedures
of the NLRB would "relegate the employees to filing charges
under a procedure too slow to be effective." 278 Moreover, the
rejection would penalize "one party to a contract for conduct
induced solely by the unlawful conduct of the other, thus giving
advantage to the wrongdoer." 27 4 The Court, therefore, held that
strikes over the unfair labor practices of the employer were protected, despite the existence of a no-strike clause and the remedial procedures of the NLRA. The contractual no-strike clause
was held to cover only the economic disputes between the parties, most of which would be subject to the grievance system.
The quoted passage refers to strikes during the section 8 (d)
no-strike period, but it demonstrates a disposition to construe
no-strike promises narrowly when strikes occur over critical employee interests.27 5 The interest in safety and health, protected
explicitly in section 502, parallels the concern expressed in Mastro in enforcing the NLRA. Serious unfair labor practices or
271. The General Counsel of the NLRB has ruled that violations of
the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act will be considered as objective evidence of abnormally dangerous conditions. NLRB, REPORT or
THE GENERAL COUNSEL (June 29, 1972).
272. Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified in various sections
of titles 5, 15, 18, 29, 42, and 49, U.S.C.). For an excellent summary of
the Act, upon which I have heavily relied, see G. GiNSBURG, CASES AND
MATER.ALs ON FEDERAL LABOR STANDARDS 303 (1973). See also BUREAU
OF NATIONAL ArFAms, THE JOB SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970 (1971).

273. NLRB v. Mastro Plastics, 350 U.S. 270, 286-87 (1956).
274. Id. at 287.
275. The Board has narrowed Mastro to apply only to strikes over
"serious" unfair labor practices, an interpretation which serves to undercut the Mastro rationale. Arlans' Dep't Store of Mich., Inc., 133 N.L.R.B.
802, 808 (1961).
For a recent definition of "serious" violations, see
NLRB, QUARTERLY REPORT OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (June 29, 1972).
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abnormally dangerous working conditions should permit conduct
otherwise within the literal scope of a no-strike clause.
The need to recognize safety walkouts is even greater than
the Court's expressed need to defer to strikes over unfair labor
practices. Safety strikes generally involve the need to respond
quickly; remedial procedures are usually inadequate. It could
well be argued that the remedial procedures of the NLRA are
adequately suited, and indeed designed, to remedy violations of
the Act which trigger employee walkouts. Safety violations, on
the other hand, are not prohibited by the NLRA, and other federal avenues are usually too slow to provide effective alternatives
to self-help.
The Occupational Safety and Health Act will not immediately provide sufficient guidance for the rational application of
an objective test. The Department of Labor is charged under
OSHA with assuring "so far as possible every working man and
woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions." 276
The Act sets out the procedures by which safety and health standards are to be created and enforced, including provisions for
inspections. Administration of the Act is primarily the responsibility of the Secretary of Labor and includes the promulgation
of safety and health standards, 27 7 the establishment of record
keeping requirements, 27 the collection and publication of statistics,2 79 and the conduct of inspections. 28 0 The standards typically
require the maintenance of specified conditions or the use of
certain methods of operation or procedure. 281 The Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare is responsible for all research and
related activity in developing the new standards, testing new
processes, and establishing standards for all toxic substances. 282
This responsibility is delegated to NIOSH, whose director is appointed by the Secretary. 28 3 Administrative decisions on contested citations and penalties are made by the Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC), an independent commission of three members appointed by the President
276. OSHA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1970).
277. Id. § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 655 (1970). See generally Morey, Mandatory Occupational Health and Safety Standards-Some Legal Problems,
38 L. & CoNTmrrM. PROB. 584, 590 (1974).
278. OSHA § 8 (e), 29 U.S.C. § 657(e) (1970).
279. Id. § 8(g), 29 U.S.C. § 657(g) (1970).
280. Id. § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 657 (1970).
281. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.23(b) (1), .93(a) (1972).
282. OSHA § 20, 29 U.S.C. § 669 (1970). See Morey,supra note 277.
283. OSHA § 22, 29 U.S.C. § 671 (1970).
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with the consent of the Senate.28 4
The general duty section of OSHA2 5 requires all employers
to furnish a place of employment free from recognized hazards
that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical
harm, and to comply with safety and health standards promulgated under the Act. The role of the general duty clause in defining "abnormally dangerous" working conditions is far from
clear. 2 6 Hazards which are likely to cause death or serious harm
could be abnormal, but the range of abnormal hazards under section 502 is arguably narrower, since the section requires that a
protected walkout be caused by greater risk than the norm for
the particular employment. The greatest value of OSHA for purposes of section 502 will involve the actual standards promulgated; they can arguably be employed as definitions of conditions
that are abnormally hazardous.
Three types of standards may be set by the Secretary of La281
bor.
First, national consensus standards already promulgated
by private safety organizations or used under the federal Walsh28 8
Healey Act may be temporarily adopted without a hearing.
Second, permanent standards are to be promulgated after formal
proceedings, including hearings. 28 9 Congress intended that these
formal proceedings would also be used in the review, modification, or revocation of the temporary consensus standards. Third,
emergency standards can be created to provide immediate protection until formal rulemaking procedures can be employed. 290
The Secretary is required to promulgate a standard through normal administrative procedures no later than six months after
publication of an emergency standard.- 91
Although the Secretary of Labor must "promulgate the stand284. Id. § 12, 29 ,U.S.C. § 661 (1970).

See Morey, supra note 277,

at 595.
285. OSHA § 5(a), 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (1970).

286. The general duty clause has stirred considerable controversy.
See generally Miller, The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
and the Law of Torts, 38 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 612, 615 (1974); Morey,
The General Duty Clause of the OccupationalSafety and Health Act of
1970, 86 HAIv. L. REv. 988 (1973); Note, The Occupational Safety and

Health Act of 1970: State Plans and the General Duty Clause, 34 Omo

ST. L.J. 599 (1973).
HATH
287. See J. CoNNoR, Standards,in OccUPATIoNAL SmTY
AcT: TRamNs Am DEVFLoPmTs 197 (P.L.I. ed. 1974).
288. OSHA § 6(a), 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (1970). See Morey, supra
note 277, at 586.
289. OSHA § 6(b), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (1970).
290. Id. § 6(c), 29 U.S.C. § 655(c) (1970).
291. Id. § 6(c) (3), 29 U.S.C. § 655(c) (3) (1970).
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ard which assures the greatest protection of the safety or health
of the affected employees," 292 the role of individuals or groups
of employees during the standard-setting proceedings is substantially limited.2 93 Employees may submit data or written comments, however, and such information may be submitted in order
to initiate the proceedings. 294 Employers seeking a variance from
promulgated standards must notify their employees, post details,
and make copies of the variance petition available. This information must inform employees of their right to contest the grant
of a variance.295 In enforcement proceedings before the OSHRC,
employees may participate to show that the Secretary, in issuing
an
the citation challenged by the employer, gave the employer 296
unreasonably long time to abate the violations of a standard.
Finally, employees, as persons "adversely affected or aggrieved"
by a decision of the Commission, may appeal to the courts to
297
modify or set aside the Commission's order.

Although the Act makes no reference to any concerted activity by employees to secure enforcement of the Act, 298 it does pro292. Id. § 6(a), 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (1970).

See MAnLLmo, supra note

14.
293. Moreover, the Act does not expressly provide for a damages
remedy and none so far has been created. One court has observed that
the purpose of OSHA is not to provide compensation for injuries to
workers but "to reduce the number and severity of work related injuries
and illnesses which, despite current efforts of employers and government,
are resulting in ever-increasing human misery and economic loss."
Skidmore v. Travelers, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 670 (E.D. La.), af'd, 483 F.2d
67 (5th Cir. 1973). Civil liability does not follow inevitably from the
violation of a statutory duty expressly made enforceable in some other
manner. See, e.g., Breitweiser v. KMS Industries, Inc., 467 F.2d 1391 (5th
Cir. 1972) (child labor provisions held not to provide a civil remedy for
damages). See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 402 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
294. OSHA § 6(b) (1), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (1) (1970).
295. Id. § 6(b) (6) (B), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (6) (B) (1970).
296. Id. § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1970).
297. Id. § 11(a), 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1970).
298. A recent court of appeals decision suggests that federal safety
statutes may provide some protection for employees exercising self-help.
In Phillips v. Interior Bd. of Mine Operations Appeals, 500 F.2d 772 (D.C.
Cir. 1974), an employee's refusal to perform allegedly unsafe work was
held to be protected under section 110 (b) (1) of the Federal Coal Mine
Health and Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. § 820(b) (1) (1970). The section protects an employee from discrimination if he has notified the "Secretary
or his authorized representative" of an alleged danger. The Court held
that the employee's action was based on his perception that work conditions were unsafe, a perception sharpened by his prior complaints. The
employee, however, had not in fact notified the Secretary of Labor, and
other sections of the Act suggest that the "Secretary or his authorized
representative" may have a narrow meaning. 500 F.2d at 785 (Robb,
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vide some role for employees in the administrative process. If
inspections occur, for instance, the employees' representative may
accompany the inspection team 299 and may notify the inspector
of any violation before or during the inspection.30 0 If the inspector should fail to issue a citation on the basis of a written request, the employee or his representative may ask the Department of Labor for an informal review to learn the reason.
Employees may also initiate complaints and request inspections without first contacting their employer or representative. 30
This is a critically important provision because the federal inspection efforts are likely to be minimal, at least for the near future.30 2 The request to inspect for a violation of a safety or
health standard need not name the employees involved, although
the employer must be provided with detailed reasons for the request. Upon receipt of the request, the Secretary must respond
by determining whether reasonable grounds exist to believe there
is a violation.3 0 3 Although rejections must be in writing, there
is no clear right to appeal a rejection, which is not strictly "an
order of the Commission" under section 11(a).104 Even if the
refusal is appealable, the chance of reversal would no doubt be
slim and the problem of delay serious.
If an inspection reveals an imminent danger, defined as a
"danger ... which could reasonably be expected to cause death
or serious physical harm immediately or before the imminence
of such danger can be eliminated through the enforcement procedures otherwise provided by this [Act],"30 the Secretary is emJ., dissenting). But see 115 CoNG. REc. 27948 (1969) (remarks of Senator
Kennedy). The protection of OSHA seems limited to one who has filed
a complaint or instituted a proceeding "under or related to" the Act.
OSHA § 11(c) (1), 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1) (1970). See G. GINSBURG, supra
note 272, at 318. Nevertheless, the court's broad protection of an employee's refusal to obey a work order after filing formal complaints is
of considerable importance. It is often difficult to prove why an employee has been fired, but the previous filing of safety complaints may
increase the probability that the discharge will be found to have been
discriminatory. The future application of the decision is of importance
because any discouragement of employees in the use of the federal safety
and health acts makes the scope of section 502 more critical.
299. OSHA § 8 (e), 29 U.S.C. § 657 (e) (1970).
300. Id. § 8(f) (2), 29 U.S.C. § 657(f) (2) (1970).
301. Id. § 8(f)'(1), 29 U.S.C. § 657(f) (1) (1970).
302. See text accompanying notes 59-60 supra.
303. NADER, supra note 9, at 187.
304. An appropriate parallel to this situation may be the wide discretion of the NLRB General Counsel to issue charges of unfair labor
practices. But see id. at 187.
305. OSHA § 13(a), 29 U.S.C. § 662(a) (1970).
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powered to seek an injunction restraining the condition pending
the outcome of statutory enforcement procedures. When an inspector finds that an inuninently hazardous situation exists, the
Act requires notification to the "affected employees and employers" of his intention to recommend injunctive actionA306 Notification occurs by posting a citation before the inspector leaves
the premises.30 7 Such notification would seem to be relevant
"objective" evidence in a section 502 hearing. Under section
13(d), should the Secretary "arbitrarily or capriciously" fail
to seek this relief, any employees who may be injured by reason
of such failure may petition for a writ of mandamus to compel
the Secretary to seek such an order. 30 The process is cumbersome, since the employees' action is to force the Secretary to initiate a subsequent federal injunctive action. In an "imminent
harm" situation, it is unrealistic to expect employees to rely
solely on multistep litigation. OSHA's procedures make clear
that the Act cannot be a meaningful substitute for employee selfhelp. Moreover, the experience thus far suggests that OSHA will
not provide sufficient guidance to assist employees faced with
an objective test under section 502. Thus, further doubt is cast
upon the efficacy of the objective test.
It is foreseeable that new agencies will find it difficult to
achieve results.30 9 The agencies involved in administering OSHA,
moreover, have too little resources for the monumental task assigned them. 310 The small number of inspections and other actions of the Department of Labor, however, do not indicate
vigorous enforcement. 31 ' For instance, few permanent standards
have been created. Since 1972, NIOSH has recommended exposure standards for fifteen dangerous substances and conditions,
including carbon monoxide, arsenic, sulfur dioxide, and ultraviolet radiation, each affecting from 300,000 to 2,000,000 workers.
Except for vinyl chloride, carcinogens, and asbestos, the Depart306. Id. § 13(c), 29 U.S.C. § 662(c) (1970).
307. Moran, A Critique of the OccupationalSafety and Health Act of
1970, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 200 (1972).
308. OSHA § 13(d), 29 U.S.C. § 662(d) (1970).
309. See NADER, supra note 9, at 197-210.
310. See text accompanying notes 59-60 supra.
311. For instance, certain consensus standards existing under various
federal laws could have been made immediately applicable under section
4(b) (2), 29 U.S.C. § 653(b) (2) (1970). The Department of Labor ignored this provision and instituted new consensus standards four months
after the effective date of the Act. See MALUmo, supra note 14, at 9.
Even some of those standards were not made immediately effective. NADER, supra note 9, at 201-02.
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ment of Labor has failed to act on these recommendations.

12

The goal for the future is a mere 15 to 20 more standards each
year-a rate at which the Department would not deal with
already existing hazards for decades, much less identify the
numerous potentially dangerous new chemicals and substances

313
continually being introduced.

Furthermore, the vast majority of all OSIIA standards are
concerned with safety rather than health.31 4 Most health standards are merely "threshold limit values" (TLVs). The TLVs
do not "define relationships between exposure and disease, nor
do they provide relative indices of hazard or toxicity. They are
simply levels above which exposure is considered hazardous." 31 51
There are TLVs for only 450 substances and agents in OSHA's
general industry standards, despite the thousands of such agents
in industrial use.316
Criticism of the agencies administering OSHA is mitigated,
however, by the magnitude of their task and insufficiency of
their resources, a common attribute of social programs. The
development and enforcement of standards is time-consuming
and requires enormous resources of money and personnel.317
Given the difficulty of determining when "abnormally dangerous" conditions exist, and the Hobson's choice employees must
make when faced with unsafe working conditions, violations of
promulgated OSHA standards should at least be evidence of
abnormally dangerous conditions, if not conclusively presumptive. Other federal laws, such as mine safety laws, should be
used for the same purpose. As Mastro Plasticsdemonstrates, pri312. OCAW Union News, Sept. 1974, at 10.
313. Sixteen thousand potentially dangerous substances are now in
use; six hundred such chemicals are introduced each year.
314. See MAiaNo, supra note 248, at 10-11.
315. Id. at 11.
316. See text accompanying note 21 supra. The agencies administering OSHA have also been criticized for an alleged indifference to hazards
in agriculture. Farmworker groups have sued the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration for its failure to issue standards protecting
workers against unsafe equipment and unsanitary working conditions.
When the agency was directed by a district court to issue an emergency
standard protecting farmworkers against pesticide poisoning, it contested
the order and won, leaving pesticide protection to the Environmental
Protection Agency, which has inadequate staff and power to enforce such
a standard. See, e.g., MiGRAN LEGAL AcTion PRoGRAM, MoNTmY REPORT,
Oct. 1974, at 3.
317. Marcus Key, director of NIOSH, estimated that development of
a comprehensive criteria document would cost approximately $200,000 to
$300,000 and require a year or more to complete. See MALrnao, supra
note 14, at 27.
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vate enforcement of federal standards is not inconsistent with
administrative enforcement procedures, even those procedures
designed to enforce the same standards.3 1 s The time consumed
in invoking the often complex provisions of OSHA encourages
the private enforcement of these provisions. Indeed, the need
for employee action when faced with safety and health dangers
may well be greater than the need for response to "serious" unfair labor practices.
In sum, the enactment of OSHA is not likely to eliminate
either the motivation or the need for employee self-help. Moreover, the progress of OSHA enforcement raises further doubt
about the wisdom and fairness of an objective test under section
502. If a strictly subjective good faith test should nevertheless
prove unacceptable, a middle position could be adopted in which
the relevant interests could be more fairly balanced in light of
the lack of information about health and safety threats. Part
VI of this Article is devoted to the description of such a compromise position.
VI. A MIDDLE POSITION: THE STANDARD OF
REASONABLENESS
A subjective good faith standard requires proof that employees honestly perceived abnormally hazardous working conditions. Any test relying upon a particular state of mind requires
factual support from which inferences can be drawn. Employees
would normally introduce evidence tending to show that hazards
existed in order to demonstrate that their apprehensions were
in "good faith." This evidence would also tend to show that conditions were in fact dangerous. Factual information, then, would
be part of the employees' case under either an objective or a
subjective test. Under a subjective test, such evidence would
weaken the objection that stoppages were based upon "mere
whim." Moreover, the evidence would be required to demonstrate that the employees had a good faith belief that the danger
was abnormally dangerous, for this is what section 502 clearly
requires.
318. Safety walkouts are arguably consistent with the statements of
congressional purpose in OSHA. A purpose of the Act is to "assure so
far as possible . . . safe and healthful working conditions . .. by encouraging employers and employees in their efforts to reduce the number
of occupational safety and health hazards at their places of employment."
OSHA § 2(b) (1), 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1) (1970). A rival bill, introduced
by Representative Daniels, would have protected the right to strike with
pay in face of hazardous conditions. The provision was deleted in committee.
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Should the subjective test not be acceptable, another standard could be devised to balance the competing interests more
fairly than an objective standard. If honesty is not sufficient,
and more objectivity is required, then the employees' action
should be tested by a standard of reasonableness. Honesty or
good faith at the time of the walkout would not alone be sufficient, yet the employees could not be penalized if their reactions
were reasonable at the time, even though those reactions are subsequently found to have been provoked by conditions not abnormally dangerous in fact.3 19 Application of the test focuses on
the employees' perceptions and behavior and the physical environment at the critical time, rather than on an ex post facto
search for objectively established abnormality. The suggested
standard cannot be said to permit strikes at the whim or fancy
of employees. It considers not only employees' perceptions but
also the reasonableness of their conduct, which depends in large
part on evidence showing the condition of the work environment.
The strongest argument for this test is that it best recognizes
the situations in which employees can be expected to use selfhelp. It is simply unfair to punish reasonable conduct based
upon a good faith perception of danger unless the opposing interests are over-powering. Admittedly, the test is similar to the
recommended "subjective" test, since under the subjective test
the reasonableness of employees' behavior would be relevant to
their "good faith" belief.
A reasonableness standard has been applied by arbitrators
when employees have refused to perform work in the face of
perceived safety threats. The normal rule that employees must
obey work orders is modified in those cases "where obedience
320
would involve an unusual health hazard or similar sacrifice."
Most arbitrators have not required an employee to "correctly"
determine the health hazard; it is sufficient that he has an honest
and reasonable belief.321 Arbitrators generally have required an
319. See Marble Prods. v. Local 155, United Stone & Allied Prods.
Workers, 335 F.2d 468, 472 (5th Cir. 1964), where the court implies that
section 502 encompasses a reasonableness test. See also Banyard v.
NLRB, 505 F.2d 342, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
320. Ford Motor Co., 3 Lab. Arb. 779, 782 (1944) (Shulman, Arbitrator). See also Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 59 Lab. Arb. 375, 378
(1972) (Silver, Arbitrator). But see Bethlehem Steel Corp., 53 Lab. Arb.
1338 (1970) (Seward, Arbitrator); North Am. Rockwell, 53 Lab. Arb. 955
(1969) (Larkin, Arbitrator).
321, See, e.g., F.M.C. Corp., 45 Lab. Arb. 293 (1965) (McCoy, Arbitrator); American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 41 Lab. Arb. 755
(1963) (Stouffer, Arbitrator); New York Shipbldg. Corp., 39 Lab. Arb.
1186 (1963) (Crawford, Arbitrator); Union Carbide Plastics Co., 34 Lab.
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employee to demonstrate a "reasonable basis for his belief"; 3 22
if the employee's appraisal is reasonable, it is irrelevant whether
in fact it is later determined that no hazard existed. 3 23 Moreover,
arbitrators have not required the danger to be abnormal-only
some danger or discomfort has been required. 324 None of these

cases, however, have involved a walkout of more than a few
employees, and in each case the employees involved were all directly confronted with the safety hazard.
Arbitral decisions suggest that the proposed interpretation of
section 502 would not result in massive economic disruption, nor
would it cripple arbitration systems or undercut the federal
policy encouraging their use. The actual standards used in arbitration, the forum usually chosen for discipline cases,3 25 reflect
a test more liberal than that adopted by decisionmakers under
section 502.
Whether section 502 will be construed to protect economic
pressure or, as seems likely, only defensive measures, the objective test does not result in a fair allocation of the dangers of
industry. The test furnishes no significant support to legitimate
employer interests or the integrity of grievance systems that
could not be supplied by the competing tests discussed in this
Article. The most logical reading of section 502 and the foreseeable employee response to health and safety threats support the
subjective good faith test or, at a minimum, a test focusing on
the reasonableness of employee perceptions at the time critical
decisions must be made. When employees are faced with honest
perceptions of danger, no enlightened society should make them
act at their peril.
Arb. 504 (1960) (Luskin, Arbitrator).
322. Laclede Gas Co., 39 Lab. Ab. 833, 839 (1962) (Bothwell, Arbitrator).
323. A.M. Castle & Co., 41 Lab. Arb. 666, 670 (1963) (Sembower, Arbitrator).
324. See Celotex Corp., 52 Lab. Arb. 1187 (1969) (Cayton, Arbitrator); Berger Steel Co., 46 Lab. Arb. 1131 (1966) (Goldberg, Arbitrator);
Gaffers & Sattler Corp., 44 Lab. Ab. 919 (1965) (Roberts, Arbitrator).
325. Most disciplinary cases are grieved. Access to the NLRB may
even be barred by the Board's deference policy. Since Collyer Insulated
Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971), in which the NLRB first deferred to the
arbitration procedure, the Board has expanded its deference to arbitral
processes by deferring in disciplinary cases. See, e.g., National Tea, 198
N.L.R.B. 62 (1972); National Radio, 198 N.L.R.B. 1 (1972).
Moreover, should the employee receive fn adverse decision in arbitration, the NLRB may defer to the award. Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112
N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955). For a criticism of this doctrine, see Atleson, Disciplinary Discharges, Arbitration, and NLRB Deference, 20 BuFFAo L.

REv. 355 (1971).

